The Washington, DC, USA-based Global Integrity, which tracks governance and corruption trends globally, awards Nepal’s Civil Society, Public Information/Media (category I among 6 other indicators) a combined score of 80 (“strong”).

As subcategories within the first category, the country’s media is given the score of 79 (“moderate”), while Public Access to Information a score of 71 (“moderate”), and its Civil Society Organizations get 91 (“very strong”).

The following are the scores for the other 5 categories: Elections 58 (“very weak”), Government Accountability 57 (“very weak”), Administration and Civil Service 63 (“weak”), Oversight and Regulation 75 (“moderate), Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law 68 (“weak”).

Media’s score (79) compares closely with three other sub-catogories-- Voting & Citizen Participation (78), Election Integrity (79) and National Ombudsman (78).

The report, a major investigative study of 35 countries, says that despite the enactment of several laws in 2007 designed to curb corruption in Nepal, the lack of political will and a turbulent political environment have completely stalled Nepal’s anti-corruption agenda.

Implementation of key legislation, such as the Rights to Information Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2008, the Good Governance Act and the establishment of the Public Procurement Monitoring Office, has not been a priority for the government, which since 2007 has shifted its attention to peace building and elections. Today, that anti-corruption legal framework is weakly enforced and the impunity of high-profile government officials is widespread, the report says.

“The country's anti-corruption institutions lack consistency in approach and clear areas of jurisdiction, which frequently results in overlapping functions. The existing anti-corruption agencies primarily target low-level bureaucrats and rarely go after senior officials,” said Global Integrity’s Managing Director, Nathaniel Heller.
The following is the edited version of the study’s take on Nepal’s media, measured in terms of 7 different questions:

1. Are media and free speech protected? (Score: 100)
In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed.
Freedom of the media is guaranteed as a fundamental right in the Interim Constitution of Nepal, as Article 15 of the Constitution specifically provides for "Right regarding Publication, Broadcasting and Press". The other constitutional provisions include: (1) Article 12, Right to Freedom (2) Article 27, Right to Information (3) Article 23, Right to Religion (4) Article 28, Right to Privacy. There are other statutes and Acts also which guarantee this right. They are: (1) Citizens' Rights Act 1955, (2) Press and Publication Act 1991, (3) National Broadcast Act 1993, (4) Working Journalists Act 1995, (5) Press Council Act 1991, (6) Defamation Act 1959, (7) National News Service Act 1962, (8) Radio Act 1958, and (9) Gorkhapatra Corporation Act 1963.

Nepal witnessed a vibrant growth of media especially after the promulgation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990. With the success of People's Movement in 1990, free media was realized as the pillar of democracy; hence, a number of media organizations came into being. Since then Nepali media have been contributing in three strategic components of anti-corruption drives: preventing, analyzing and fighting. However, lack of training, poor professional standards, the dearth of investment into investigative reporting, and the non-implementation of the statutes/Acts make it difficult, and sometimes impossible, for journalists to access, impart or disseminate accurate information; let alone the political biases and partiality they practice in their reporting.

Apart from that, media development in Nepal remains constrained by inadequate legislation and/or implementation of laws as well as the lack of both institutional capacity of media organizations and resources (human and material). There are two vital laws enacted for protecting the rights of journalists and media freedoms. These include the Working Journalists Act and the Right to Information Act (18 July and 8 August 2007 respectively). However, both laws have not been enforced due to the lack of appropriate regulations and other implementation-related issues.

In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.
Comments: In principle, freedom of speech has always been regarded as a fundamental right in Nepal. However, in practice, state-run media has always been the mouthpiece of the ruling party, and it is often misused to propagate respective political ideologies. One of the latest examples is that Nepal's Maoists were accused of curbing free speech while they were in the government (AlJazeera TV Report of 13 July 2008). Besides, different outfits affiliated to the Maoists, including the Young Communist League (YCL), are reported to have been engaged in storming the media house (Himal Media) and physically attacking the media persons, simply for the reason that differing opinion was expressed.

Peer Review Comments: In law yes, but in practice no. The Maoists hardly enjoy their fair criticism and the journalists who oppose their methods or ideology are often subject to threats.

2. Are citizens able to form print media entities? (Score: 75)
In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.
Comments: There are no barriers to forming a print media entity, normally. State atrocities against the press have stopped since the establishment of loktantra (democracy) on April 24, 2006. However, although the country has become Federal Democratic Republic, therefore ending the 240-year long monarchy, the journalists who have been synonymous with this struggle still have not been able to enjoy press freedom even after the democratic government was in place. The freedom of press has narrowed which is shown by the increasing murders of journalists, attacks on the press, interference and threats. The journalists are becoming insecure with each passing day due to the lack of action taken against those who are involved in suppressing press freedom.
In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeals mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

Comments: The appeals mechanism for when a print media license is denied or revoked lies with the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court is the second in the tiers of judiciary that have general jurisdiction over appeals.

In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.

Comments: There is no fixed time frame or standards for obtaining a print media license . A license may be obtained within one to three months depending on the media type. In most cases, citizens can get a print media license within a week whereas electronic media may have to wait a little longer than print media because there is need for approval from the Ministry of Information and Communication for frequencies of transmission. However media owners, who can exert power, may get such a license even within a day. In other cases, ordinary citizens may encounter delays due to traditional bureaucratic procedures and, most often, due to unwillingness on the part of officials when applicants do not offer "consideration" (speed money).

Peer Review Comments: It took many years for Sagarmatha FM, the first community-owned FM radio station, to start operation in post-1990 Nepal.

3. Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities? (Score: 69)
In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity.

Comments: There is no such barrier to forming a broadcast (radio and TV) media entity, legally and politically. There is much more media presence especially after the second people's movement of 2006. A number of private television channels are in operation. The trend of establishing new television channels continues as Terai TV has already started broadcasting whereas a couple of new television channels, including News 24, are in the offing.

Similarly, there are more than 20 commercial and community FM radio stations in the Kathmandu valley alone. The number beyond the Kathmandu valley is also large. However, Nepal has yet to amend the laws and regulations on broadcasting in the spirit of the guarantees provided by the Interim Constitution and the recommendations of the Media Commission. The outcome has been rapid but haphazard growth in licensing new broadcasters, especially FM radios, whose management, growth and sustainability remain major challenges.

In law, where a broadcast (radio and TV) media license is necessary, there is an appeals mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.

Comments: The Appellate Court hears the appeals when a broadcast license is denied or revoked. Like other types of media, both radio and TV are equally entitled to appeal in the event of a denial. The Press Council of Nepal, a statutory body, also looks into such matters and may make suggestions to the Government of Nepal.

In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period.

Comments: No fixed terms and standards for obtaining a broadcast (radio and TV) media license within a reasonable time period are prescribed. Obtaining a license may take from one to three months depending on the media type, and an applicant's efforts, including follow-up as well as his/her political connections. The licensing process may take even longer if frequencies of specific areas are not available.

In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a broadcast (radio and TV) media license at a reasonable cost.

Comments: Licenses for a broadcast (radio and TV) media license can be obtained upon paying prescribed nominal government fees. The cost of a broadcast license is relatively costly compared to the print license.

4. Can citizens freely use the Internet? (Score: 100)
In practice, the government does not prevent citizens from accessing content published on-line.
Comments: No restrictions regarding the access to content published on-line have been imposed so far. Nepal's rural population still does not have adequate access to the Internet when compared to the urban population. However, Internet use is being expanded, even in semi-urban and district headquarters, and people can have access to it provided they do have the knowledge and skill of operation. The government has enacted the Cyber Act to govern this area; the Act, however, is still not effectively implemented because of the lack of capacity and mechanism.

The Electronic Transaction Act (Cyber Act) 2006 has not only legalized all forms of electronic transactions and digital signatures but has also clearly spelled out ways to regulate various computer-based activities and punish cyber crimes. The computer and cyber crimes such as hacking, piracy, copyright violation, fraudulent and all other deceitful activities have been clearly defined and punishments are set accordingly. The action against such crimes and punishment will be in the range of a minimum 50,000 Nepali rupees (US$673) to a maximum 3,000,000 (US$40,376) Nepali rupees in cash and six months to three years of imprisonment.

The Act has set forth legal framework, administrative and application mechanism for electronic transaction and digital signature. Besides legal validity of electronic records and digital signature, the Act has made a provision of Comptroller of Certification authority (CCA). The Act is divided into 12 sections and 80 clauses with detailed information on role and rights of the regulator, certification authority, customer, government and all the concerned stakeholders. It has also envisaged a separate judicial body, the IT Tribunal, and the Appellate Tribunal, to look into all cases related to computer and cyber crimes. The 3-member tribunal shall be headed by the district court judge or legal officer of equivalent status. The tribunal shall be responsible for preliminary cases, while the appellate tribunal will look into major appeals.

The electronic transaction and digital signature is valid not only for the private sector but also for the government agencies. It allows the government offices to use electronic medium for tender notice, vacancy announcement and others. It also validates public procurement and acceptance of electronic applications.

In practice, the government does not censor citizens creating content on-line.
Comments: Censorship of online content is not practiced generally. Any online content or material, as long as it does not violate the law of the land, can be created and posted. The Cyber Act restricts and controls unlawful contents on the Web. The government has started to regulate in this area; focused intervention, however, has not been possible due to the transition period. In the absence of established monitoring mechanism, strict scrutiny is impossible.

5. Are the media able to report on corruption? (Score: 75)
In law, it is legal to report accurate news even if it damages the reputation of a public figure.

Comments: No radio station, television channel, website or other type of digital or electronic means; or press or any other communication media of Nepal shall be censored, closed, seized or have its registration canceled for printing and publishing any news item, article, editorial and writing.

In practice, the government or media owners/distribution groups do not encourage self-censorship of corruption-related stories.

Comments: No restrictions or self-censorship regarding corruption-related stories have been imposed by the government generally. However, attacks against the media and journalists continues unabated in Nepal. Various groups that have been accused of attacking the media and journalists are affiliated with political parties and groups all of which have specific demands for inclusion in the new constitution.

Journalists have been attacked for both reporting and/or not reporting on these groups and their demands in the ways the proponents would have liked. Attacks on the media intensified after July 2008. Besides, the law and order situation in Nepal has deteriorated and many parts of the country have little or no government presence. The security situation has also worsened. General insecurity, especially that of media workers, has also been reported mainly in the eastern region's hill districts. In the southern plains there are over a dozen armed groups claiming to represent the demands of the Madhesi people, whilst violence in the hills is related to the demand for establishing autonomous identity-based provinces.

Furthermore, media companies have faced increasing disruptions owing to trade-union related disputes championed by workers affiliated with the Maoist party. The government has failed to bring those accused of violence against journalists to justice. The authority's inability to guarantee justice to the victims has sent the message that it is acceptable to attack the media, which could have long-term implications in a society with weak or almost non-existent law enforcement.

Peer Review Comments: The owners who depend on advertising money from business houses do their part in trying to pressure their reporters. There have been several cases, most of which go unreported, outside the organizations of the newspaper owners where stories were "ordered" to be dropped.

In practice, there is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) on publishing corruption-related stories.

Comments: Because of the constitutional and statutory provisions, media cannot be prevented legally from publishing or airing controversial or corruption-related materials. It is the general practice, however, that media houses themselves opt for self-censorship in the event of lack of reliable evidence. In some cases, any story which does not have a "news value," or is related to the owner of that particular media, may not be published. Whereas in other cases, journalists get discouraged due to security reasons as armed groups often threaten journalists, especially in regard to extortion-related stories.

6. Are the media credible sources of information? (Score: 65)

In law, print media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.
Comments: Because laws require mandatory registration, ownership must be disclosed by the media entities in Nepal. So far as the ownership is concerned, foreign investment is also reported in media but the real investors often are not reported on because these investors use Nepali citizens as cover for completing the legal formalities.

In law, broadcast (radio and TV) media companies are required to publicly disclose their ownership.
Comments: Ownership of broadcast (radio and TV) media companies is automatically disclosed, as registration and formal legal process is mandatory.

In practice, journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.
Comments: In Nepal, the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ) and Press Council Nepal (PCN) have jointly developed the code of conduct for journalists. The Press Council of Nepal is the statutory body that regulates the press in terms of the implementation of the said code of conduct. Section 12 of the Nepal Press Council Act provides for hearing and settlement of complaints against abuse of press freedom by media practitioners from any person or a party aggrieved.

There has been a steady increase in the number of complaints lodged by private parties in subsequent years. Most of the complaints deal with the violation of the code of conduct prescribed by the Council. For instance, PCN received 10 complaints during 2007/08 and 16 complains during 2008/09 fiscal year. From fiscal year 2009 up to 2009 BS, a total of 113 complaints were filed at PCN. Among them 39 were categorized as defamation.
A noted civil society activist in Nepal has this to say about media professionalism: "When a news items gets published in a newspaper about an alleged act of corruption, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate if it is (1) a professional medium at work, (2) a ploy to defame a political adversary, (3) a proxy shot at an honest person on behalf of media groups or (4) even a notice of extortion."

Part of the reason is that although a professional journalist is appointed as chairman of the press council, PCN lacks the capacity to effectively implement the code of conduct because the appointment is political, so he or she may be influenced by political ideology or by the individual who appointed her or him. In addition, journalists' salaries and incentives are inadequate, so breach of code of conduct cannot always be prevented, especially in the tabloids. The code of conduct is limited to mere formality.

Peer Review Comments: The majority of the journalists working for the leading newspapers, television, radio and other publication outlets follow ethical standards and are mostly unbaised in their reporting, with the exception of the newpapers or publications that are mouthpieces for political parties or government-owned media.
Peer Review Comments: Maintaining standard practices inside media houses largely depends upon the financial condition of the publication houses themselves. In general, you can see standard practices being followed in the media houses if their income is enough to meet expenses and generate profits for investors.

In practice, during the most recent election, political parties or independent candidates received fair media coverage.

Comments: Nepal's media is vibrant and diverse and has the potential to play a major role in facilitating debate and discussions on constitution making and state building. However, its ability, and that of journalists, to facilitate impartial dialogue is contingent on building a fear-free environment where journalists can work independently and impartially while communicating messages to and from readers and audiences.

A few professional media houses or organizations apart notwithstanding, many mainstream and popular media in Nepal are not free from political biases. It is apparent that party politics still continues to have undue influence within the journalistic community itself (to the extent that some journalists' trade unions are based on party affiliation) at the expense of professional interests and solidarity. This political affiliation puts at risk the ability of the media to provide unbiased coverage and facilitate impartial dialogue on the complex issues related to state building. There have also been reports of identity playing into the already politicized divisions.

More recently, there has developed a trend of establishing media entity just to propagate the respective political ideologies or issues. The latest example is that many madheshi groups have established different media just to further their agenda of so called "one madhesh: one province."

In practice, political parties and candidates have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.
Comments: Throughout the history, state-owned media have never been independent in Nepal. The party in power has always controlled the media to routinely discriminate against the opposition. The opposition parties, therefore, do have limited access. The situation gets even worse in the event of a coalition government. It is a general practice that the minister, who oversees the Ministry of Information and Communication, monopolizes the media as much as possible.

Peer Review Comments: The Ministry of Information and Communication is a favored ministry because it controls the state media. The state-owned media acts like the government and, by extension, the ruling party s (or even the party that occupies the portfolio) propaganda machine. Therefore, fair media coverage for all the candidates is still a far cry from reality.

7. Are journalists safe when investigating corruption? (Score: 67)
In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been imprisoned.
Comments: No reported case of formal imprisonment of journalists for investigating corruption. However, the data available with Press Freedom Monitoring Unit of the Federation of Nepalese Journalists suggests that there were 32 arrests and detentions during a period from May 2008 to April 2009.

Peer Review Comments: There were no journalists arrested or jailed for investigating or writing about corruption cases.

Peer Review Comments: Yes, there were some arrests of journalists, but not because they were investigating stories on corruption cases.

In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been physically harmed.
Comments: No reported case of actual harm, particularly to the journalists covering corruption, by the state. However, the Federation of Nepalese Journalists reports an instance of the police beating up the Biratnagar-based reporter Gokul Parajuli who went to report on news at Urban Development and Building Construction's Office; however, there is no clear mention about whether he was there to cover corruption-related news.
Besides, there are plenty of incidences of interference by the non-state actors. One such mentionable incident involves a group headed by the Vice-President of Media Printing Labor Association Ramesh K.C. and Hotel and Restaurant Labor Association Central Chairman Ramesh Babu Pant who were involved in attacking the reporters of Himal Khabarpatrika and vandalizing their office property.

Peer Review Comments: There was no such cases reported.
In practice, in the past year, no journalists investigating corruption have been killed.
Comments: Nepal's political system became supportive of press freedom and freedom of expression after April 2006, but media and journalists continue to struggle for their safety in a climate of growing impunity. Contrary to the general expectation that the installation of an elected government would lead to improvements in the media environment, the situation began worsening in mid-2008 with the killings of two journalists.

However, there is no reported case of a journalist who was investigating corruption being killed. Yet, the Federation of Nepalese Journalists has recorded over 342 incidents of press freedom violations between January and December 2008. Two journalists were killed in Nepal this year. Among those killed were Janakpur-based reporter Uma Singh and Kailali-based reporter J.P. Joshi. The whereabouts of Kanchanpur-based reporter Prakash Singh Thakuri is still unknown, even after two years after his abduction.

Peer Review Comments: No journalist has been reported killed for this reason.

Peer Review Comments: Yes, some journalists were killed in the past, but not because they were involved in any investigation of corruption cases.

> For referenced text on media, go here.
> For the entire report, go here.

###

Nepal's news media entered 2009 in a state of crisis. Attacks on the press had escalated in late 2008 amid a climate of impunity. The Federation of Nepali Journalists (FNJ), a local press freedom group, led weeklong, nationwide demonstrations to raise awareness about the deteriorating environment. On December 28, 2008, Maoist leaders signed a 10-point agreement to address the lawless situation. Clauses included a promise to create a governmental bureau to investigate press freedom violations, local news reports said.

But a full year later, as 2009 was coming to an end, the agreement had yet to be implemented and optimism was scant. The January slaying of a journalist who had documented Maoist land seizures had further chilled a press corps that had grown accustomed to unpunished attacks.

Nepal had made a historic political shift in 2008 from a monarchy to a coalition-ruled democratic republic under the leadership of former Maoist rebels. During the decade-long civil war that preceded a 2006 peace accord and transition to multiparty democracy, both rebels and monarchists were responsible for harassment, detention, disappearances, and murders of journalists, nearly all of which have gone unpunished. Abuses did not cease with the communist faction?s inclusion in the democratic process. Maoists accused of murdering journalists Birendra Shah in 2007 and J.P. Joshi in 2008 remained at large. International human rights groups said the party?s Youth Communist League abducted and likely murdered freelancer Prakash Singh Thakuri in 2007. Police dropped an investigation into the disappearance?Thakuri?s body was never recovered?in February 2009, according to FNJ.

In late 2008, the Nepali-language monthly Nepali Sarokar catalogued war-time Maoist land seizures on the Terai plains, in southern Siraha district. On January 11, as many as 15 men with knives entered the compound where the article?s author, Uma Singh, a print and radio reporter in her 20s, had rented a ground-floor apartment. A neighbor discovered the journalist, mortally stabbed, on the veranda of her one-room dwelling. The brutal murder combined the worst of Nepal?s media climate: ineffective police investigation, alleged Maoist involvement, and ethnic tensions destabilizing the plains along the India-Nepal border. Local journalists said police ignored Singh?s profession as a possible motive for fear of political repercussions and arrested five people, including the victim?s sister-in-law. The five were accused of killing Singh over a property dispute.

Property did play a role, according to an International Media Mission report compiled by press freedom groups that visited Nepal in February; Singh believed Maoists abducted and murdered her father and brother in 2005 and had seized family land. Yet she defended all victims displaced in the conflict, and addressed sensitive issues including communal violence and women?s rights in print and on air.

The arrests of the five people, who included a local Maoist, did not assuage the concerns of Singh?s colleagues, who said at least two cadres affiliated with a former Maoist minister tied to abuses Singh documented had fled the country after the crime. Other suspects had links with armed groups of ethnic Madhesis, who traditionally occupy the plains and are engaged in an often-violent campaign for political autonomy, or, at its most extreme, a separate state. The Terai Ekta Parishad, one of dozens of such groups, made an unverified claim to have murdered Singh, according to the international mission.

?There is no denying that [Singh] may have had a personal stake in the issue of land seizures, but her journalism was exercised in the larger public interest,? the mission report said. After consulting with police, family members, and colleagues, the mission concluded that, although there were several overlapping motives and actors involved, her work was a major factor in her death.

Singh?s killing was not solved by late year, and its shadow hung over the Terai press. Several journalists left the region, according to local news reports. Madhesi groups separately threatened two regional correspondents for independent media group Kantipur Publications: Jitendra Khadka in January and Manika Jha in February. Parsa district?s Gadhimai FM programmer Gyanendra Raj Misra was wounded in the hand in a February shooting that FNJ reported was work-related. In August, the Madhesh Terai Forum in Saptari district banned distribution of Nepali-language newspapers?the region is dominated by dialects of Hindi?and torched 15,000 copies of national newspapers, according to FNJ.

After the 2008 elections, in which the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) won a majority, the Maoist-fronted coalition government began talks with some pro-independence Madhesis. By mid-2009, though, the government was focused on its own conflicts. In May, Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal dismissed the chief of the army; in a move many believed was unconstitutional, President Ram Baran Yadav overturned the decision, prompting Dahal to resign. Maoist lawmakers walked out on a May 23 vote to select his replacement, and Madhav Kumar Nepal, of the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist), ran unopposed.

The strife deepened political fissures, and journalistic objectivity attracted punishment more often than praise. The principals behind attacks were varied, and included official agents. Police threatened Janapratibimba editor Sanjaya Saha in May for publishing a story alleging they took bribes, FNJ reported. Shiva Oli from the western Doti district went into hiding for three days in July after officials involved in a corrupt drinking water project he exposed had taken him for questioning. Later in Doti, on August 23, police beat Nepal Samacharpatra journalist Bimal Bista while subduing a mob and detained him for 48 hours, according to FNJ.

Journalists cited several confrontations with Youth Communist League members, but youth branches of other political parties were also abusive. Students, farmers, and trade unionists?often politically affiliated?assailed journalists covering their activities. In multiple incidents catalogued by FNJ, vandals stoked fires with stacks of newspapers. The national news group Kantipur Publications was a particular target, but provincial news outlets also suffered. Editorials from the capital bemoaned the rise of self-censorship.

Analysts said press freedom clauses in the interim constitution enacted in 2007 provide a positive framework for the document?s final manifestation, which Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal declared would be adopted on schedule by May 2010. However, journalists complained that existing legislation, such as the 2007 Right to Information Act, has yet to be implemented. Prime Minister Nepal also committed to reversing impunity in a range of human rights abuses. Nepal ranked eighth worst in the world on CPJ?s 2009 Impunity Index, which lists countries that have consistently failed to solve journalist murders.

> You can also read this report here.
> For the global report, see ATTACKS ON THE PRESS: 2009, by the Committe to Protect Journalists, Washington DC.

###

1. Customer care: Real competition is in the customer care areas. It goes without saying that NT's customer relation is the poorest among all existing operators. There is a growing tendency in NT employees to work less & less and seek more & more benefits. It goes without comment that it is against the principle of survival. Here the truth of life is that "one cannot get more then it produces." The areas where NT deals with customer/people are badly affected due to the 'don't bother' attitude of NT employees.

One glaring example is service of '1498'.This is the number where 3.2 million GSM mobile customers are supposed to get response about their queries/complaints regarding mobile telephone service. One will be surprised to know the quality of service of 1498. When you want service through this number, you will be lucky if you are able to get access to this number, even if you get access the response is non polite, non professional, rude & incomplete. The response is only 3%, which means that out of 100 only 3 people get answer to their quarries.

What is the use of running customer care where only 3% get response and 97% don't?

Conclusion: Either run it properly or close it.

2. Price war: Many people feel that reducing price retains customers. I feel customers are not retained only by price, it is quality of service that is the most important. What is the value of low price if you cannot listen what the other person is telling. Reducing price is making business non-profitable thereby reducing the capability of origination to improve Quality of Service.

Conclusion: It is not the price; it is quality that retains customers.

3. Pay as you use, pay when you like to pay: Eighty percent of NT’s fixed line customers pay less then Rs. 300/ per month. Out of 600,000 fixed line customers 480,000 travel to the counter of Nepal Telecom to pay their monthly bills. The cost of transportation may itself run in hundreds. On the other side, more than thousands of NT staff members are employed in collecting or processing the bills.

To save both side from this unnecessary trouble, just think if NT introduces a scheme in which customers can pay as the prepaid customers of mobile. He/she can buy the recharge coupon from nearby stores and recharge his/her phone as per his/her uses and as per his/her choice of time and convenience. NT cannot only save work hours in thousands of its staff members involved in bill collection, it can also get three months worth of revenue in advance from customers.

Another case is postpaid mobile subscribers. Out of 3.2 million GSM Mobile customers only 100,000 are postpaid. Many of them live in places where even if there is NT counter, it does not have payment facility for post paid mobile. Just think if these customers are allowed to pay in prepaid mode, how comfortable will they feel?

Conclusion: Technology is available to do this, why don't we do this?

4. Mobile money transfer:
Guess what percentage of people has access to bank? What percentage of people has a bank account? You will be surprised only 5-7% our population has a bank account. How can the economy of people in rural areas improve if they don't have access to bank accounts? How can they save money and then start borrowing when needed? In absence of bank facility, they enter into vicious circles of borrowing and spending and remain poor throughout their life.

Mobile Telephone can help these people to walk out of poverty trap. They can save money in an account through mobile telephone. The mobile number will be linked to individual bank account in a certain bank. The owner does not need to come to bank for opening the bank account. He/she can deposit, withdraw, transfer and make payment using his/her mobile telephone.

Mobile money will greatly help poor people in the rural areas, who have no access to a bank account, thus helping to enhance their standard of living.

Conclusion: Let us start MMT without delay.

5. Prescriptions for NT:
i) Out source: Outsourcing should be done in all those areas for which manpower is available in the country, like inquiry service, cash collection, driver’s job, letter distribution, service distribution like SIM/RUIM, recharge coupons. Even network maintenance jobs like BTS maintenance, cable network maintenance, cable network pulling etc. should be out-sourced. It will be cheaper, predictable and measurable.

ii) Infrastructure sharing: Let us open a joint venture infrastructure company in collaboration with other operators in the country. Let all the partners put their present infrastructures like Towers, Battery, Air-conditioning, Generators into this company. This new company will put new towers as per the requirement of operators and maintain the old ones. This will not only make our services cheaper but also save cities from environmental issues. If we don't go for this, the day is not far when all the houses in metropolitan area will have towers and power supply will be a big issue.

iii) Fund Management: NT has NRs. 25 billion in reserve and it generates around Rs. 5 billion as surplus each year. It is not able to invest the 5 billion it generates as surplus each year. Hence the reserve amount of NT is growing each year. NT has invested this money with Nepal Rastra Bank’s Bonds and has deposited with other commercial bank. It earns an interest of 9-10% on its investment.

Many infrastructure projects like road, electricity, petroleum, civil aviation sector are suffering from the lack of capital. The country is acutely suffering from shortage of power, crippling the telecom networks and bringing the life of people to hardship. Industries are also suffering in a big way.

It was with this consideration that I purposed that NT should invest in Hydropower. Discussion was held regarding upper Tamakoshi and Trisuli III Hydro electric project. Now, as per information, NT has agreed to invest NRs. 6.6 billion in the Tamakoshi HEP. It will get an interest on 6.0 billion and 0.6 billion is as equity. Let us see the return NT will get on this module.

Presuming interest of 10% on 6.0 billion and return of 25% on 0.6 billion, the net return on investment will be 0.60+0.15= 0.75 billion or 11.36%, which is really a poor rate of return considering the a) Poor financial position of NEA, b) Poor management capability of NEA, c) Likely delay in implementation of the project due to different factors. I think we need to reconsider this investment.

It seems necessary that NT develops criteria for such investment like follows.
1. Put money in project which benefits general Nepali people.
2. Put money in project of national need and importance.
3. Put money in project where rate of return is more or equal to ROR as investment in Telecommunication.
4. Put money in projects which are preferably owned by government. It helps NT to decide investment faster and be less controversial.
5. Put money in a project which will enhance NT's image as agency for national development.

Conclusion: Major like above has been long due in NT and needs action than discussion.

Mr. Goel is a manager with Nepal Telecom. This article is adapted from Telecom Smarika (Sixth Anniversary Souvenir 2010). The edited is edited for clarity. Nepal Telecom celebrated its 6th Anniversary on Feb 5, 2010.

###

The study by the Family Health Division (FHD) of the Department of Health Services with funding support from UK Department for International Development (DFID) and USAID was carried in carried out in 8 districts—Baglung, Jumla, Kailali; Okhaldhunga, Rupandehi, Rasuwa, Sunsari and Surkhet with a total population of 3,298,319, comprising 12 percent of Nepal's population. The total population of women between 15-49 years was 86,000.

The study, carried out between 13 April 2008 to 13 April 2009, tracked changes in maternal mortality in the country since 1998, when the last such survey was conducted.

According to the report entitled “Maternal Mortality and Morbidity Study, 2008-09: Summary of Preliminary Findings”, suicide was far in the lead, accounting for 16 percent of deaths, with the second leading cause, accident, accounting for 9 percent Haemorrhage and eclampsia were the only maternal causes featuring, at 2.5 percent and 2.3 percent respectively, ranked eleventh and twelfth. This suggests that, despite improvements over the last decade, at least in management of post-partum haemorrhage, these complications still need focused attention.

The finding that suicide has emerged as the leading cause of death in Women of Reproductive Age (WRA) has shocked researchers and policy makers although some women activists have commented that the findings are not surprising, given that cases of suicide mostly remain underreported in Nepali society. In the 1998 study, suicide had ranked as the third single cause of death.

There’s also a heartening aspect in the findings. Maternal mortality rate in Nepal has improved substantially since 1998, from 539 per 100,000 live births to 229 per 100,000. A substantial reduction in the MMR, to 281 deaths per 100,000 live births was also indicated by the 2006 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey.

The report says that the shocking finding that suicide was reported as the leading cause of WRA deaths (16%), a steep increase from 1998, when it was ranked third (10%), highlights the urgent need to address this issue, which has received little attention since its significance was first noted in 1998. Research is needed to improve understanding of the circumstances and contributory factors of these tragic events, to guide interventions. Analysis of verbal autopsy data indicates mental health problems, relationships, marriage and family issues are key factors. It is also noteworthy that 21% of the suicides were young women, aged 18 years and under, indicating that youth is a factor to be investigated.

The report notes that there have been significant improvements over the past 10 years in access to routine and life saving care and prevention of maternal deaths. The findings also align with the NDHS 2006 MMR estimate, which indicates Nepal is on track to meet the fifth millennium development goal. This is a major achievement in a resource-poor setting that has suffered from political instability over much of this period. However, the stories of the hundreds of women who died during this study period are evidence of many issues that remain to be tackled.

Key findings
The overall Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) for the eight study districts is 229 per 100,000 live births, ranging from 153 to 301 by district. This is consistent with the 2006 Nepal Demographic and Health survey (NDHS) estimate of 281 per 100,000 live births.

MMR variations: The MMR was lowest amongst women in their twenties, with increased risk for those aged under 20 and between 30-34. The figure for those aged over 35 was considerably higher (962 per 100,000 live births). There were also differences between ethnic groups, with higher rates among Muslims, Terai /Madhesi and Dalits.

Maternal causes accounted for 93% of pregnancy related deaths, giving an overall pregnancy related mortality ratio of 247 per 100,000 live births and making this a good proxy indicator for maternal mortality.

Maternal causes accounted for 11% of all

The percentage contributions of eclampsia, abortion related complications, gastroenteritis and anaemia to maternal causes have increased, while those from obstructed labour and puerperal sepsis have more than halved since 1998. Heart disease did not even feature in 1998, but now accounts for 7%.

Place: There was an increase in the proportion of pregnancy related deaths occurring in a health facility, to 41%; with 40% occurring at home; and 14% in transit. In 1998 just 21% of deaths occurred in facilities and 67% at home.

Timing: All non-maternal pregnancy related deaths occurred during the antepartum period. Many were unwanted pregnancies, suggesting the pregnancy status of the women may have placed them at greater risk. Of the maternal deaths, 39% occurred during the intrapartum period and up to 48 hours afterwards and 61% in the antepartum and deaths of women of reproductive age, in postpartum periods suggest that third place by ICD-X chapter; down from 21% in 1998, when it was the leading cause by ICD-X chapter.

There has been a dramatic increase in the contribution of suicide (16%) to deaths of women of reproductive age, compared with 10% in 1998. This makes it the leading single cause of death, whereas in 1998 it was third.

Direct causes accounted for 69% of all maternal deaths and 31% were due to indirect causes. The proportion of direct deaths is considerably higher when only hospital deaths are considered (89% direct; 11% indirect).

The percentage contribution of haemorrhage (24%) to maternal causes has been dramatically reduced, down from 41% in 1998. However, it remains the leading cause of maternal death, and the decline reflects a reduction in postpartum (from 37% to 19%), rather than antepartum interventions should focus more on this period.

Over 80% of women who died from maternal causes were emergency admissions and in a critical state on admission: 18% died within four hours of arrival, 39% within the first twelve hours and 53% within the first 24 hours.

Supply side factors contributing to poor maternal outcomes included continued use of practices which are not evidence based, lack of appropriate staff; lack of essential drugs; weak referral systems and lack of blood.

Community factors contributing to poor maternal outcomes included delays in recognising the problem and deciding to seek care; long distances to a health facility; lack of finance and/or transport or time taken to make arrangements; seeking care from the informal sector; not being able to or not wanting to seek care alone or needing permission to seek care.

To read the full report (in PDF), go here.

###

This was revealed by Fred Pearce in a New Scientific article (11 January 2010). Fred writes in his piece that Hasnain had said in an email interview with him in 1999 that all the glaciers in the central and eastern Himalayas could disappear by 2035. He adds: Despite the 10-year-old New Scientist report being the only source, the claim found its way into the IPCC fourth assessment report published in 2007. Moreover the claim was extrapolated to include all glaciers in the Himalayas.

Until a few days ago, the IPCC stood its ground and but has now, following the New Scientific article, it has begun to review their report.

In India, some dissenting comments were out soon after the IPCC released the report in 2007. Recently, on November 9, 2009, a government-sponsored study conducted by V.K. Raina, former Deputy Director-General, Geological Survey of India, dismissed a total glacier retreat in the Himalayas [See the report entitled
Himalayan Glaciers – A State-of-Art Review of Glacial Studies, Glacial Retreat and Climate Change, 2009]. The Indian study accepted the fact that some glaciers in the Himalayas are retreating, but it asserted that the trend "is nothing out of the ordinary. Nothing to suggest as some have said that they will disappear."

In recent weeks, war of words also broke out between the IPCC chair Rajendra Pachauri and the Indian environment minister, Jairam Ramesh. Pauchari called India 'arrogant' in its assessment of glacier retreat and Ramesh attacked the IPCC report for lacking scietific evidence.

The entire controvery has raised many questions about the processes of climate change knowledge. This one appears to be an example of shoddy scholarship, one that has serious implications to climate change awareness, specially in the Himalayan region. What should the common masses living right next to or down the glaciers make out of this controvery? Does such misinformation do them any service? Seeing experts themselves lock horns over an issue that concerns them intimately, aren't they now utterly confused?

Besides confusing the ordinary folks, the falsified assertion in the IPCC study also helped mininform an expert report (An Overview of Glaciers, Glacier Retreat, and Subsequent Impacts in Nepal, India and China, 2005) by World Wildlife Fund. The WWF said in a statement, Jan 20, 2010: Although scientists remain deeply concerned about glacier retreat in that region, this particular prediction has subsequently proved to be incorrect.

Are there more such studies that cited the said speculation?

The naysayers in Climate Change politics must be happy, and they are. But for those whose lives are directly impacted by this issue, it is an unfortunate incident. Undoubtedly, experts, policymakers and journalists must work to dispel their confusion, based on reasons of science, but also their own life-experiences. And combining the two is often a tough task, but a required task anyway.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assertion & Retraction by IPCC

Assertion (2007): Climate Change 2007: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability

10.6.2 The Himalayan glaciers
Himalayan glaciers cover about three million hectares or 17% of the mountain area as compared to 2.2% in the Swiss Alps. They form the largest body of ice outside the polar caps and are the source of water for the innumerable rivers that flow across the Indo-Gangetic plains. Himalayan glacial snowfields store about 12,000 km3 of freshwater. About 15,000 Himalayan glaciers form a unique reservoir which supports perennial rivers such as the Indus, Ganga and Brahmaputra which, in turn, are the lifeline of millions of people in South Asian countries (Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, India and Bangladesh). The Gangetic basin alone is home to 500 million people, about 10% of the total human population in the region.

Glaciers in the Himalaya are receding faster than in any other part of the world (see Table 10.9) and, if the present rate continues, the likelihood of them disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps sooner is very high if the Earth keeps warming at the current rate. Its total area will likely shrink from the present 500,000 to 100,000 km2 by the year 2035 (WWF, 2005).

The receding and thinning of Himalayan glaciers can be attributed primarily to the global warming due to increase in anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases. The relatively high population density near these glaciers and consequent deforestation and land-use changes have also adversely affected these glaciers. The 30.2 km long Gangotri glacier has been receding alarmingly in recent years (Figure 10.6). Between 1842 and 1935, the glacier was receding at an average of 7.3 m every year; the average rate of recession between 1985 and 2001 is about 23 m per year (Hasnain, 2002). The current trends of glacial melts suggest that the Ganga, Indus, Brahmaputra and other rivers that criss-cross the northern Indian plain could likely become seasonal rivers in the near future as a consequence of climate change and could likely affect the economies in the region. Some other glaciers in Asia – such as glaciers shorter than 4 km length in the Tibetan Plateau – are projected to disappear and the glaciated areas located in the headwaters of the Changjiang River will likely decrease in area by more than 60% (Shen et al., 2002). [go here for these portions on IPCC report]

Retraction (2010): IPCC statement on the melting of Himalayan glaciers (see note 1)

The Synthesis Report, the concluding document of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (page 49) stated: "Climate change is expected to exacerbate current stresses on water resources from population growth and economic and land-use change, including urbanisation. On a regional scale, mountain snow pack, glaciers and small ice caps play a crucial role in freshwater availability. Widespread mass losses from glaciers and reductions in snow cover over recent decades are projected to accelerate throughout the 21st century, reducing water availability, hydropower potential, and changing seasonality of flows in regions supplied by meltwater from major mountain ranges (e.g. Hindu-Kush, Himalaya, Andes),
where more than one-sixth of the world population currently lives."

This conclusion is robust, appropriate, and entirely consistent with the underlying science and the broader IPCC assessment.

It has, however, recently come to our attention that a paragraph in the 938-page Working Group II contribution to the underlying assessment (see note 2) refers to poorly substantiated estimates of rate of recession and date for the disappearance of Himalayan glaciers. In drafting the paragraph in question, the clear and well-established standards of evidence, required by the IPCC procedures, were not applied properly.

The Chair, Vice-Chairs, and Co-chairs of the IPCC regret the poor application of well-established IPCC procedures in this instance. This episode demonstrates that the quality of the assessment depends on absolute adherence to the IPCC standards, including thorough review of "the quality and validity of each source before incorporating results from the source into an IPCC Report" (see note 3). We reaffirm our strong commitment to ensuring this level of performance. (Released in Geneva, 20 January 2010)

Notes
1. This statement is from the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the IPCC, and the Co-Chairs of the IPCC Working Groups.
2. The text in question is the second paragraph in section 10.6.2 of the Working Group II contribution and a
repeat of part of the paragraph in Box TS.6. of the Working Group II Technical Summary of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.
3. This is verbatim text from Annex 2 of Appendix A to the Principles Governing IPCC Work.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Also see
> Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), 2007

###

In its latest report entitled "Nepal: Peace and Justice" (released Jan 14, 2010) ICG says that failure to address the systematic crimes committed during Nepal’s ten-year civil war is threatening the peace process. "There has been not a single prosecution in civilian courts for any abuses." The executive summary & recommendations follow:

Executive Summary & Recommendations
Failure to address the systematic crimes committed during Nepal’s ten-year civil war is threatening the peace process. There has been not a single prosecution in civilian courts for any abuses. The cultures of impunity that enabled the crimes in the first place have remained intact, further increasing public distrust and incentives to resort to violence. The immediate priorities should be prosecutions of the most serious crimes, investigation of disappearances and action to vet state and Maoist security force members.

There are tensions between the pursuit of justice and the pursuit of peace. An absolutist approach to accountability for past abuses is impossible in practice and could obstruct the compromises needed to bring formerly warring parties together to forge a stable political settlement. But tackling impunity and improving accountability has a direct and acute relevance to managing Nepal’s fractious transition. Unaccountable and heavy-handed security measures by a state with weak legitimacy have escalated conflict before and threaten to do so again.

Multiple grievances are not being effectively channelled through the constitutional process, and dealing with them is fraught with risk as long as political violence remains a viable tool. Yet moving from a state of impunity to one of accountability will be a painful transition for many individuals in the security forces and political parties. Avoiding, or deferring, this discomfort may appear tempting but is counterproductive. Longstanding cycles of abuse have undermined prospects for improved public security and peaceful political debate.

Both sides carried out repeated and systematic violations of the laws of war during the conflict, which ended with the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). State security forces accountable primarily to the interests of party leaders or the palace felt unconstrained by legal requirements. They were responsible for hundreds of disappearances and unlawful killings, rampant torture and other abuses of the civilian population. Of the more than 13,000 people killed during the war, the vast majority died at the hands of the state. The Maoists, in challenging a state they portrayed as unjust and illegitimate, sought to characterise violence – including brutal killings of civilians and political opponents – as an essential, and justified, plank of political strategy.

At the heart of the peace deal lay a commitment to recognise that both sides had broken fundamental rules. But neither believes its actions were wrong. Both insist on judging their own, meting out no real punishment, and have refused to cooperate with civilian authorities. Lack of action on justice is not for lack of promises. Commitments to human rights norms and specific steps such as investigating disappearances have been central to successive agreements, including the CPA. Lip service, however, has only become entrenched as a substitute for action.

Concern for victims has been inconsistent. The most tangible response has been interim relief payments to families of those who died or were disappeared. Yet this has been weakened by political manipulation and the lack of effective oversight of fund distribution. For relatives of the more than 1,000 still missing, distress, frustration and a sense of betrayal have grown.

Political parties have shown no interest in dealing with past crimes. Indeed, they have exploited the lack of accountability to avoid reining in the unlawful activities of their own activists and to justify regular interference in the criminal justice system. This has left a demoralised, ineffective and increasingly desperate police force to confront growing insecurity and small yet still dangerous local, regional and ethnic struggles.

But political leaders alone are not to blame. The domestic constituency for justice is minimal. Despite the pioneering work of some activists, rights and justice are not rallying calls for the politically influential middle classes. Citizens are not keen to re-examine what the state did in the name of their security, and see no need for national dialogue and catharsis. Many victims were from disadvantaged communities long marginalised by the state and more influential social strata. Media and parliamentary attention to questions of justice is sporadic.

International efforts are no substitute for national will. Nevertheless, international commitment is to support a peace process based on fundamental rights. Allowing words to replace substance undermines such principles. The UN has lost credibility as its core values have been marginalised during the process. With no systematic vetting of peacekeeping troops by either the government or the UN, even high-profile alleged abusers have been deployed in lucrative posts in UN missions – including, in September 2009, one army major sought by Nepal’s police and courts for questioning over the torture and murder of a teenage girl in 2004 inside a Nepali peacekeeping training centre. Countries providing military assistance, including the U.S., UK, India and China, have rarely or never restricted training and opportunities for individuals or units accused of serious violations.

Clear priorities are required. The first should be prosecution of the most serious conflict-era cases. Without a credible threat of prosecution, any commissions of inquiry will not get beyond the inadequate explanations the army and Maoists have already provided. The second is to ensure the commissions on disappearances and on truth and reconciliation specified in the CPA meet basic standards and, more importantly, are domestically owned and have clear, achievable goals. Finally, vetting is needed – both domestically and internationally – to help ensure the stability of any future security forces.

Recommendations
To All Political Actors Party to the Peace and Constitutional Processes:
1. Act to fulfil the commitments to justice made in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, focusing on the manageable and urgent priorities of establishing a commission on disappearances and investigating and prosecuting the most serious conflict-era crimes for which there already is substantial evidence.

2. Forge an all-party consensus and publicly commit to work towards ending impunity, initially by ending political interference in criminal proceedings, including the withdrawal of cases by the council of ministers, and halting illegal activities of party youth wings or other affiliated groups.

3. Within negotiations over the future of Maoist combatants and state security forces, most immediately in the work of the special committee and its technical sub-committee, establish procedures to vet all potential members of future security forces to exclude human rights violators.

To the Government of Nepal:
4. Direct and equip the police and attorney general’s office to pursue investigations and prosecutions of all serious conflict-period crimes by:

a) giving direct instructions to police to execute outstanding arrest warrants;

b) setting up special police and prosecutors’ units to investigate and prosecute war crimes, with senior and experienced staff backed by sufficient resources and insulated from politically motivated transfers;

c) shielding courts and judges from pressure and taking firm action against any individual or institution that obstructs the course of justice;

d) establishing simple, effective channels for victims and others to communicate with police and prosecutors; and

e) identifying resource gaps, such as forensic capacity and witness protection, and drawing up plans to address them, including by requesting international assistance if appropriate.

5. Refuse, and if already granted revoke, promotions and UN peacekeeping positions to members of the security forces accused of grave violations unless and until they have been exonerated in credible independent investigations; suspend individuals who are the subject of police investigations or for whom arrest warrants have been issued.

6. Instruct the Nepalese Army to cooperate fully with investigations, including by making records of internal investigations and court-martials and other relevant internal documents available to police and prosecutors and making individuals available for police interview or court appearance when formally summoned.

7. Implement existing Supreme Court decisions relating to war crimes, disappearances and the obligation of police to register complaints and investigate alleged crimes.

8. Offer official responses to reports and recommendations of the National Human Rights Commission and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

To the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist):
9. Respect the authority of the police and civilian courts and cooperate fully with investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the conflict and ceasefire periods by:

a) making suspects available for questioning or, where warrants have been issued, arrest;

b) handing over internal investigation reports;

c) sharing any other relevant evidence or records; and

d) cooperating in the establishment and functioning of the disappearances commission, in particular by full disclosure of all information relating to disappearances in which Maoist forces are implicated.

To the International Community, in particular the UN and Donors Represented in Kathmandu:
10. Build on the emerging common strategy on impunity to focus attention on practical measures to encourage progress on justice issues by:

a) introducing visa bans on individuals facing credible, documented allegations of war crimes;

b) reviewing donor assistance to areas such as interim relief payments for victims and their families and setting clear benchmarks for continuing direct financial support;

c) establishing principles for possible future support to Maoist combatants’ integration and rehabilitation, such as an effective vetting mechanism and prosecutions of the most serious crimes; and

d) pressing for a government response on OHCHR’s reports and recommendations, raising the issue at the UN Human Rights Council if there is no progress.

11. UN member states, the Security Council and the UN system should urgently work to ensure that peacekeeping contributions conform to universal human rights principles and are consistent with the UN’s responsibilities to the peace process in Nepal, by:

a) establishing a comprehensive human rights vetting policy for peacekeeping missions and ensuring systematic pre-deployment screening of Nepali peacekeepers;

b) linking levels of peacekeeping contributions and senior appointments to demonstrable progress on accountability for war crimes and steps to ensure non-repetition; and

c) preparing enhanced training and support for possible additional deployments once the CPA provisions on security sector reform, including integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants, are implemented.

To Providers of Military Assistance and Training, in particular India, China, the U.S. and UK:
12. Condition all military assistance and training on cooperation with civilian investigations and prosecutions of war crimes, at a minimum excluding all security force personnel and units facing credible allegations of human rights violations from training.

> The full text of the report is here.

###

I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1879 (2009), by which the ouncil, following the request of the Government of Nepal and the recommendation of the Secretary-General, renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) until 23 January 2010. UNMIN was established as a special political mission in 2007 and its mandate included the monitoring of the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M), which is now the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M).

2. The report reviews the progress of the peace process and the implementation of the mandate of UNMIN since my report to the Security Council of 26 October 2009 (S/2009/553).

II. Progress of the peace process
The peace process remained largely stalled during the reporting period. The tensions, deep differences and istrust among the parties which I highlighted in my last report have persisted. While the major political parties maintained some level of dialogue and communication, no agreement has so far been reached on critical issues, including ntegration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel, democratization of the Nepal Army and the scope of presidential authority. The proposed high-level political mechanism to serve as a dedicated forum for multi- party dialogue on key peace process issues has not been established. UCPN-M continued its series of nationwide protests calling for what it terms "civilian supremacy" over the Nepal Army, a demand that has its roots in the President's reversal, in May 2009, of the dismissal of the Chief of Army Staff by the then Maoist-led Government, following which the Government resigned.

4. The Special Committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate Maoist army personnel has not made headway in its work nor has it formally considered the draft proposals submitted by its Technical Committee. Important progress was achieved in November, with the announcement by UCPN-M that it would proceed quickly with the discharge of all its personnel disqualified through the UNMIN-led verification of the Maoist army in 2007. On 16 December, further significant movement was made with the signing of an action plan by the Government, UCPN-M and the United Nations for the discharge and rehabilitation of those disqualified as minors. Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly has made slow progress on drafting the new constitution, which is to be promulgated by 28 May 2010.

5. As the stalemate has continued, tensions have risen within and among the parties, and talks among senior leaders of the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) and UCPN-M have remained inconclusive. The major Madheshi parties have continued to voice dissatisfaction with what they regard as their exclusion from political discussions among the major parties. President Ram Baran Yadav and UCPN-M Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, "Prachanda", also held discussions during the reporting period, but without apparent progress. In other forums, the President's role was discussed extensively in the context of the legal situation that could arise if the new constitution is not promulgated by 28 May 2010, and if no fresh deadline can be set.

6. UCPN-M-led protests calling for "civilian supremacy" disrupted daily life as well as the functioning of Government offices around the country. On the first day of a nationwide general strike held from 20 to 22 December, a major clash occurred between Maoist demonstrators and the security forces in Kathmandu, during which some of the worst violence since 2006 led to a reported 75 people being injured, several seriously. The protracted blockade of the Legislature-Parliament has resulted in a backlog of bills for consideration, including one that could resolve the issue of the Vice-President having taken his oath of office in Hindi. The obstruction was lifted briefly from 23 to 25 November to allow passage of the budget for the fiscal year 2009-2010, averting an imminent financial crisis. On 23 December, UCPN-M ended its almost seven-month blockade of the work of the Legislature-Parliament.
7. On 11 December, UCPN-M began a series of declarations of "autonomous federal states", notwithstanding the current work within the Constituent Assembly to determine the future federal structure of Nepal. The President, the Prime Minister, leaders of several parties, the media and several organizations representing ethnic groups in areas where the "states" have been declared strongly criticized this step, which UCPN-M downplayed as a "symbolic" action. My Representative has strongly urged that all parties should refrain from provocative statements or actions and permit the democratic process to function.

8. In a similar fashion, tensions escalated sharply over the seizure of land and crops by people with the support of UCPN-M-affiliated organizations. On 4 December, a fatal clash in the Kailali district in the far-western region between people who had occupied a forest area and security forces deployed to remove them led to four fatalities, including one member of the security forces. UCPN-M responded with protests the following day and with a nationwide shutdown on 6 December. The Government and a number of senior political leaders have called the recent UCPN-M actions breaches of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and have drawn this to UNMIN's attention.
9. During the reporting period, the Minister of Defence again called for fresh personnel recruitment for the Nepal Army. UNMIN has consistently stated that such recruitment would be in violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The proposed recruitment of some 5,000 personnel has not yet begun.

10. The brinkmanship and confrontation between the Maoists and the Government, accompanied by a sharp and dangerous hardening of positions, is making a negotiated solution significantly more difficult.

A. Drafting of the constitution
11. The protracted political stalemate has had an impact on the constitution drafting process. The Constituent Assembly has concluded discussions on concept papers and draft texts submitted by 8 of its 10 thematic committees, intended to provide the basic tenets and language of the new constitution, however the committees on the determination of forms of governance of the State, on State restructuring and sharing of State power, and the Constitutional Committee itself, have yet to present their papers. The Constitutional Committee has the core responsibility for compiling the concept papers and texts into the draft of the constitution as well as determining the preamble, emergency measures, transitional provisions and other issues that do not fall under the direct ambit of the thematic committees for submission to the Constituent Assembly. Owing to those delays, on 23 December, the Constituent Assembly announced an eighth amendment to its workplan for drafting the new constitution, reducing the public consultation period to three weeks and making the deadline for promulgation — 28 May 2010 — increasingly tight. On 25 December, the Constitutional Committee decided on 98 constitutional provisions, most of which centred on terminology, through a voting process.

B. Integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel
12. The Special Committee to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate Maoist army personnel, to be convened by the Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, on a weekly basis, had met only five times by late December. It has made little or no substantive progress during the reporting period, and has yet to consider proposals submitted by its Technical Committee on 17 September for a supervisory mechanism and a code of conduct for the Maoist army personnel. UCPN-M has not attended several meetings, and in mid-November it stated that command and supervision modalities as well as integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army should be resolved at the senior-most political level rather than by the Special Committee, as part of the broader negotiations to end the current political stalemate.

13. The Technical Committee completed its assessments of the Maoist army
cantonments as scheduled on 28 October, and has continued to develop a plan for the integration of Maoist army personnel. It is also planning a number of seminars and study visits in early 2010 in order to draw on best practices from other post- conflict countries that have undertaken integration and rehabilitation programmes.

C. Discharge of disqualified Maoist army personnel
14. After several months of discussion, on 16 December, an action plan was adopted for the discharge of the disqualified Maoist army personnel verified as minors, as part of the decision to discharge all disqualified personnel. It was signed by representatives of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and UCPN-M, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the Representative of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Nepal, and was witnessed by the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction, Rakam Chemjong, UCPN-M Chairman "Prachanda", my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, and my Representative in Nepal.

15. The action plan includes the predischarge screening of some 2,973 personnel verified as having been minors in May 2006, followed by an official discharge and the monitoring of UCPN-M compliance by a United Nations team. Under the plan, UCPN-M commits itself to ensuring that the minors can freely and independently determine their areas of return or resettlement and, if they so wish, avail themselves of rehabilitation support. The Government has continued to express its readiness to provide vocational, educational and other rehabilitation packages with assistance from the United Nations.

16. CPN-M (and subsequently UCPN-M) has been listed in the annexes of the past five annual reports of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict as a party to conflict recruiting and using children, and compliance with the action plan is necessary for it to be de-listed from the report. The United Nations has underlined its concern over any future possible induction of those disqualified as minors into any groups engaged in violence. The discharge of the 4,008 personnel verified as minors and late recruits is scheduled to begin on 7 January.

D. Other challenges affecting the peace process
17. The Government has continued to implement a special security plan aimed, in particular, at controlling crime and road blockades in the Tarai districts and has reported an improvement in the security situation in the targeted areas as well as more widely throughout the country. There has been a significant increase in the number of security personnel deployed, including through the establishment of additional Armed Police Force bases and increased patrolling. Arrests of alleged members of armed groups and criminals have increased, but so have accusations of arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of detainees by the security forces. The Armed Police Force has begun recruiting to fill over 11,000 new vacancies, of which 5,000 were approved during this reporting period. The status of the over 10,000 new positions proposed by the Nepal Police remains under consideration by the Ministry of Finance.

18. Friction between youth wings of the political parties has continued, with violent clashes taking place between cadres of the UML-affiliated Youth Force and the Young Communist League of UCPN-M in the eastern and mid-western regions in early November and December, resulting in injuries on both sides. Some militant ethnic and identity-based groups, notably in eastern Nepal, have continued their extortion drives. Other ethnic and indigenous groups continue to lobby and organize demonstrations to press the Government to fulfil their demands, as among other things, for greater inclusion in the public sector. In early December, the Madheshi People's Rights Forum-Nepal (MPRF-N), led by Upendra Yadav, announced a renewed campaign to mobilize the Madheshi community in this regard.

III. Status of the United Nations Mission in Nepal
19. As at 7 December 2009, 264 of the authorized 278 personnel were serving in the Mission. Out of 192 civilian personnel, 31 per cent are women. Of the 52 substantive staff, 40 per cent are women, while 27 per cent of 140 administrative staff are women. As of that date, 5 of the 72 arms monitors serving with the Mission were women. Gender representation in this area is dependent on the nomination of candidates by Member States. As a result of UNMIN's efforts to recruit national staff from traditionally marginalized groups, 50 per cent of the 125 national staff are from traditionally marginalized groups, and 33 per cent are women.

IV. Activities of the United Nations Mission in Nepal

A. Arms monitoring
20. The Arms Monitoring Office has continued to monitor compliance by the Nepal Army and Maoist army with the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies. The arms monitors continued round-the-clock surveillance at the Nepal Army weapons storage site in Kathmandu and the weapons storage areas in the seven main cantonment sites of the Maoist army. The teams of arms monitors at the main cantonment sites also regularly visit the satellite cantonment sites. Other operations are conducted by mobile teams from the headquarters of the Arms Monitoring Office in Kathmandu. At the request of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, arms monitors witnessed salary payments for October and November to verified Maoist army personnel at the cantonment sites.
21. On 23 October, Kathmandu-based representatives of the following member

States of the Security Council, China, France, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, visited the Nepal Army weapons storage site in Kathmandu and the Maoist army main cantonment site in Ilam district. They met with senior Nepal Army and Maoist army personnel, viewed the weapons storage facilities and other areas in the cantonment site, and were briefed by the Mission's Chief Arms Monitor.

22. The Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee continued to meet under the chairmanship of the UNMIN Chief Arms Monitor. Senior officers representing the Nepal Army and the Maoist army continued to cooperate on decision-making, information exchange and dispute resolution. Between October and December, the Committee held four meetings and considered two alleged violations of the Agreement, one of which was unsubstantiated while the other remains under investigation. During the reporting period, the Arms Monitoring Office investigated several allegations made by the Government of misconduct by Maoist army personnel outside the cantonments. In the interim, neither the Nepal Army nor the Maoist army have carried out the recommendations proposed to them, as indicated in my previous report to the Security Council, to confirm the number of their respective personnel and increase their cooperation with UNMIN on the notification of troop movements (see S/2009/553, para. 24); nor has there been progress on formalizing confidence-building measures related to joint humanitarian and mine action-related activities.

B. Child protection
23. The Child Protection Unit continued to contribute to planning for the discharge and rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel disqualified as minors, including taking part in the information and consultation phase. The Unit worked closely with United Nations country team partners to review the rehabilitation packages for the disqualified and with the Political Affairs Office on the action plan for the discharge of the minors. The Unit also continued to work with the Nepal task force established under Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) which is co-chaired by UNICEF and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)-Nepal, to implement the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism under that resolution. The Unit coordinated inputs for the annual report on children and armed conflict in Nepal, which will be considered by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, and will also contribute to the Secretary-General's report on children and armed conflict for 2009.

C. Political affairs
24. The Political Affairs Office continued to monitor and analyse the political situation in the country, including through field visits to the regions, and to assist Mission leadership in supporting the peace process. Political affairs officers met regularly with stakeholders, including Government officials, representatives of political parties and civil society organizations, as well as international actors. The activities of militant groups, both armed and unarmed, and their potential to disrupt the peace process were monitored, as were the dynamics among the political parties and the evolving role of traditionally marginalized groups in the peace process. The Office followed the roceedings of the Constituent Assembly and the work of its committees in preparing the new constitution. The Office has also led in coordinating the activities of UNMIN with the United Nations country team partners regarding the discharge and rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel disqualified as minors and late recruits.

D. Public information
25. Media reports continued to draw attention to UNMIN's arms monitoring role, particularly in light of increasing Government allegations of the Maoist army's misconduct outside the cantonments. The Public Information and Translation Unit provided information and clarification to the media based on the findings of the Arms Monitoring Office. The Government and senior leaders also drew UNMIN's attention to alleged UCPN-M involvement in incidents which they described as breaches of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. My Representative underlined in several interviews the need to establish a national monitoring body for this purpose. The Unit also provided support to the visit of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict.

E. Safety and security
26. The security situation has been generally stable across the country. Traffic was severely disrupted during some of the Maoist protest programmes in Kathmandu and elsewhere in the country, but United Nations vehicles have generally been permitted to move freely. A number of improvised explosive devices planted at Government buildings and political party offices were defused by the local security forces' disposal personnel and no casualties were reported. There were no direct threats against United Nations staff or property during the reporting period.

V. Human rights
27. There was no substantial progress during the reporting period in addressing impunity and ensuring ccountability for human rights violations committed during or after the conflict. The Government continued to demonstrate a lack of willingness to hold members of the security forces accountable for human rights violations committed during or after the conflict and continues to withhold cooperation with civilian authorities responsible for investigating these cases. UCPN-M similarly failed to cooperate with the authorities and end impunity despite several assurances that those responsible for human rights abuses would be held accountable.

28. On 24 December, the Government promoted to the second-in-command of the Nepal Army a major general who was the commander of the Tenth Brigade at a time when serious human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, torture and disappearances, occurred at the then Royal Nepal Army Maharajgunj barracks during the period from 2003 to 2004. This significant promotion took place despite strong criticism by national and international human rights groups. OHCHR-Nepal expressed concern and issued a press release reaffirming its position that those implicated in human rights violations committed by members of the Tenth Brigade in 2003 and in 2004 should not be promoted, pending completion of a full, transparent and impartial investigation. Subsequently, the Supreme Court ordered a stay of this promotion in response to a public interest litigation. The Court will consider the merits of the case later in January.

29. The Nepal Army recently deployed a military officer accused of involvement in the 2004 torture and killing of 15-year-old girl, Maina Sunuwar, as a member of a Nepal Army contingent serving with the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). The deployment took place on 7 September, despite the issuance of an arrest warrant for the officer by the Kavre District Court in January 2008. On 13 September, the Court also issued an order instructing the Nepal Army to suspend him immediately. Upon the recommendation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat, in view of the serious nature of the allegations, the officer was repatriated on 12 December. He remains in Army custody despite a formal request by the Nepal Police and public calls by the National Human Rights Commission, civil society leaders and members of the international community to turn him over to the police so that he can be brought before the Court. Senior Nepal Army personnel and the Minister of Defence have made statements challenging the civilian court's jurisdiction over the case, and indicating the officer would not be turned over to the police before a military court of inquiry had completed an investigation into the circumstances of the repatriation. As recommended in my previous report, the Nepal Army should comply urgently with the court order.

30. UCPN-M has failed to take any action to address the alleged involvement of party members in serious crimes, both during and since the conflict, including the killings of businessman Ram Hari Shrestha; journalists Birendra Sah and Arjun Lama, who were reportedly killed by Maoists in April 2005, and the bombing of a bus in Madi in Chitwan district on 6 June 2005, which resulted in the death of 36 civilian passengers. OHCHR has repeatedly raised all these cases with the UCPN-M leadership as emblematic of continuing impunity.

31. The Government has taken a number of positive steps towards the establishment of transitional justice institutions. Draft legislation criminalizing disappearances and establishing the framework for a commission of inquiry on disappearances was approved by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the Legislature-Parliament in November. While improvements were made to the draft legislation, it does not comply with international standards. The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction completed its series of public consultations with victims of the conflict and other stakeholders including women and children on a draft bill establishing the framework for a truth and reconciliation commission. The current version of the bill falls short of international standards. However, the Ministry has indicated that it will now revise the bill before submitting it to the Cabinet.

32. The National Human Rights Commission continued to face challenges in implementing its mandate. A new law governing the Commission's work is yet to be passed and the bill submitted by the Government to the Legislature-Parliament has been broadly criticized as being inconsistent with the Paris Principles.

33. In November, the Prime Minister launched a year-long campaign to address gender-based violence. An action plan was prepared after broad consultations with a range of stakeholders including women, human rights activists and representatives of the Government, political parties, civil society and non-governmental organizations. It is primarily aimed at increasing victims' access to justice and reducing the incidents of gender-based violence.

34. In early December, a journalist was attacked and left seriously injured in Rukum district. She had recently written an article about the killing of a UML leader allegedly by the CPN-M, in Rukum during the conflict. A team of human rights defenders conducted a fact-finding mission in the district and found that 20 persons were arrested in connection with the incident and later released.

VI. Mission support
35. The mission support component continued to support UNMIN activities throughout the Mission area, with priority being given to the work in the seven main Maoist army cantonment sites. The continued presence of arms monitors at the cantonments and their conduct of mobile patrolling require the wide deployment of personnel, as well as communications and air transport resources.

VII. United Nations country team coordination
36. During the reporting period, development activities were affected by the political stalemate, in part due to the disruptions caused by the Maoist protest programmes. The passage of the budget in November averted an imminent crisis in Government spending and forestalled disruption to donor supported development programmes. Recent attempts at extortion by ethnic movements, political party representatives and armed groups against development and humanitarian actors prompted the United Nations and donors jointly to issue a renewed appeal on 23 November, for all parties to respect the "Basic operating guidelines". The guidelines were developed by development and humanitarian partners during the conflict period to protect the freedom of the respective organizations to assist beneficiaries and implement projects without military and political interference.

37. Severe and protracted drought, sustained high food prices and the global
economic crisis have tripled the number of food insecure people in Nepal over the last three years. An additional 300,000 Nepalese are now facing food insecurity because of the poor summer crop harvest, bringing the total number to 3.7 million. This is aggravating the already very poor nutritional status of children, and levels of acute malnutrition in some districts are now above emergency thresholds. The World Food Programme (WFP) has been providing food assistance to more than 1.6 million of those Nepalese most in need, which has helped to stave off hunger for many. This level of assistance will be needed through early 2010 until winter crops are harvested in May and June.

38. The United Nations Mine Action Team will soon commence the final phase of
its work, to be completed during 2011, in support of the Government's efforts to meet its commitment under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to clear all remaining minefields in Nepal. The United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal has released $500,000, which partly meets the funding requirements for this final phase of the Action Team's work. If additional funding is made available, it is expected that Nepal will become one of the first countries in the world to be free of the impact of mines after a conflict provided that progress in clearance is sustained. By 8 December, the Action Team had safely destroyed over 40,000 improvised explosive devices and other dangerous items from the Maoist army cantonment sites. Mine risk education led by the Department of Education supported by UNICEF has trained and equipped over 1,000 teachers in the 20 most affected districts. Some 500,000 schoolchildren have been educated in avoiding the risks of mines, and more importantly, explosive remnants of war, which have caused more casualties in Nepal than mines.

39. In parallel with the launch of the Government's National Plan on Gender- Based Violence in early September, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF and the United Nations Women's Fund (UNIFEM) launched a joint United Nations programme on gender-based violence. The project aims to increase the use of community-level gender-based violence prevention and protection services by women, men and children. The programme will complement the recent expansion of UNICEF support for paralegal committees from 23 to all 75 districts, to be financed through a $10 million grant from the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom.

40. The United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal approved four new programmes costing $5.5 million, including: reporting and responding to conflict-related child rights violations (Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009)); services to victims of sexual violence (Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000), 1612 (2005), 1820 (2008), 1880 (2009) and 1888 (2009)); support to the Government for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008); and support for an impartial and efficient reparations system for conflict-affected persons.

VIII. Observations
41. My successive reports to the Security Council have sought to provide a frank account of the state of Nepal's peace process and the role of the United Nations in supporting it. I have drawn attention to the serious problems that have plagued the process, largely stemming from the breakdown of trust and cooperation among the parties, particularly since the 2008 election of the Constituent Assembly, and more recently the May 2009 crisis, which further escalated tensions.

42. Since May, Nepal's political situation has become even more complex, with growing divisions within and among the parties. Positions have hardened at the opposing ends of the political spectrum, which has seriously eroded the common middle ground that had, from the outset, defined the peace process and remained its driving strength. There is a growing and worrying risk of the political discourse being dominated by extreme voices and the focus shifting away from the peaceful and democratic path.

43. I have underscored to all concerned the grave danger posed by this situation. While I remain hopeful about the ability of Nepal's political leaders to come to an appropriate political resolution, it is a cause for serious concern that the numerous rounds of discussions between the three major parties over the past several months have not resulted in a resolution of the stalemate. Despite the welcome revival of the inter-party talks in December, the signing of an action plan to discharge the disqualified Maoist army personnel and the ending of the UCPN-M blockade of the Legislature-Parliament, at the time of writing, the major disagreements that have brought the peace process close to a standstill remain unresolved, increasing the risk of its collapse. Once again, I strongly urge the Nepalese parties to make every effort to return to their tradition of working by consensus that has yielded positive results and to lead the peace process to a successful conclusion. Nepal's friends and the supporters of the peace process, including in the region, should now, more than ever, encourage the parties to overcome their differences.

44. Integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel and democratization of the Nepal Army are critical aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Successive Governments of Nepal have conveyed to me their intention to complete the integration and rehabilitation process of the Maoist army personnel without delay. The implementation of this process would allow UNMIN to wind down its work. Regrettably, there is little progress to report on this front. While technical work has continued around the identification of options for the Maoist army personnel, albeit with limited participation of the UCPN-M in the Special Committee, the critical decisions that need to be taken at the political level to ensure forward movement have remained elusive in a political environment that is becoming increasingly polarized and confrontational.

45. Failure to address the continuing political constraints carries great risks. In extending the mandate of UNMIN four times in response to the requests of the Government of Nepal, the Security Council has repeatedly urged the Nepalese parties to work together for the success of the peace process and to safeguard the significant gains that Nepal has made in ending its 10-year civil war, holding elections which resulted in a broadly representative Constituent Assembly and declaring a republic.

46. The country is now entering a crucial period. The coming few months before the May 2010 date for the promulgation of a new constitution are critical for the successful conclusion of the peace process. While it is my desire to see UNMIN complete its mandated tasks and end its presence as soon as possible. However, withdrawing the Mission at this particular time of heightened tension would not be the wisest course. Should the Government of Nepal, in consultation with the parties, request an extension of the Mission's current mandate, I would recommend that the Security Council respond positively to such a request.

47. It must be underlined, however, that the continued presence of UNMIN in Nepal during the coming period must be seen in the context of the stated commitment of the parties to adhere to the timelines set out in the interim constitution, and not simply as another extension of the term of the Mission. Should the Council endorse an extension of the mandate, it is of the utmost importance, given the weight of the issues at stake, that such extension lead to a set of clear benchmarks and timelines being agreed upon by the parties as soon as possible. These, in turn, should create an unambiguous exit strategy for UNMIN within the time frame of the new extension.

48. I would like to convey my appreciation to the members of the Security Council and other Member States for their continued support to Nepal and to the work of the United Nations in support of the peace process. I would also like to thank my Representative, Karin Landgren, and her staff, as well as partner organizations in Nepal, for their dedicated efforts.

Relevant Links
> Full text of the report in PDF is here.

###

Two appalling events marked 2009: one was the largest ever massacre of journalists in a single day – a total of 30 killed – by the private militia of a governor in the southern Philippines and the other was an unprecedented wave of arrests and convictions of journalists and bloggers in Iran following President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed reelection.

------------------------------------------

Highlights 2009
76 journalists killed (60 in 2008)
33 journalists kidn009apped
573 journalists arrested
1456 physically assaulted
570 media censored
157 journalists fled their countries
1 blogger died in prison
151 bloggers and cyber-dissidents arrested
61 physically assaulted
60 countries affected by online censorship

------------------------------------------

A total of around 160 journalists in all continents were forced to go into exile to escape prison or death, often in very dangerous circumstances. The Iranian press photographers crossing the Turkish border to escape arrest or the Somali radio journalists fleeing to neighbouring countries to avoid certain death had all reported essential news and information that some people would go to any lengths to suppress.

Wars and elections constituted the chief threat to journalists in 2009. It is becoming more and more risky to cover wars as journalists themselves are being targeted and face the possibility of being murdered or kidnapped. But it can turn out to be just as dangerous to do your job as a reporter at election time and can lead directly to prison or hospital. Violence before and after elections was particularly prevalent in 2009 in countries with poor democratic credentials.

No one should be surprised that, as bloggers and websites continue to flourish, censorship and repression have surged proportionately. There is almost no country nowadays that has entirely escaped this phenomenon. As soon as the Internet or new media (social networking, mobile phones etc) start to play a leading role in the spread of news and information, a serious clampdown follows. Bloggers are now watched as closely as journalists from the traditional media.

Our major concern in 2009 has been the mass exodus of journalists from repressive countries such as Iran and Sri Lanka. The authorities in these countries have understood that by pushing journalists into exile, they can drastically reduce pluralism of ideas and the amount of criticism they attract. “This is a dangerous tendency and it must be very strongly condemned,” Reporters Without Borders secretary-general Jean-François Julliard said as this review of 2009 was released.

Number of journalists killed up by 26 per cent
Almost every journalist killed in 2009 died in their own country. The exception was Franco-Spanish documentary film-maker Christian Poveda, who was murdered in El Salvador. “Less known to international public opinion than the foreign correspondents, it is these local journalists who pay the highest price every year to guarantee our right to be informed about wars, corruption or the destruction of the environment,” Julliard said.

The year began very badly with the Israeli military offensive in the Gaza Strip. As well as refusing to allow foreign media into this territory, the Israeli government carried out military strikes against buildings housing media, in violation of international humanitarian law. Two reporters were killed in these attacks. Journalists and human rights defenders in the Russian Caucasus went through a terrifying year. The witnesses to the dirty war waged by Moscow and its local allies to be “eliminated” with complete impunity included Natalia Estemirova in Chechnya and Malik Akhmedilov in Dagestan. Radical Islamist groups caused the death of at least 15 journalists worldwide. Nine reporters were killed in Somalia, where the Al-Shabaab militia carried out constant targeted killings and suicide attacks. Four of these journalists worked for Radio Shabelle, which does its best to provide news amidst the surrounding chaos. Reporters in Pakistan have increasingly been targeted by the Taliban in the northwest of the country.

Kidnappings have also continued to rise. Most cases are concentrated in Afghanistan, Mexico and Somalia. New York Times journalist David Rohde and his fixer managed to escape from the Taliban but Afghan reporter Sultan Munadi was killed in the military operation launched to rescue him.

“Three years have passed since the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1738 on the protection of journalists in conflict zones but governments still seem incapable of protecting reporters,” Reporters Without Borders said.

Other forms of violence, physical assaults and threats have gone up by a third (from 929 cases in 2008 to 1,456 in 2009). Journalists are most at risk in the Americas (501 cases), particularly when they expose drug-trafficking or local potentates. Asia comes next with 364 cases of this kind, chiefly in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The number of censored media is escalating alarmingly with nearly 570 cases of newspapers, radio or TV stations banned from putting out news or forced to close. This happened to a satirical magazine in Malaysia, a score of reformist newspapers in Iran, Radio France Internationale in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the BBC World Service in Rwanda.

The number of journalists arrested fell slightly (from 673 in 2008 to 573 in 2009) above all because there were fewer cases in Asia. The largest number of cases was in the Middle East.

Election violence
The 30 journalists killed in the Mindanao Island bloodbath in Philippines had been covering an attempt by a local governor’s opponent to run as a candidate for regional elections in 2010. Tunisian journalist Taoufik Ben Brik was imprisoned in the days following President Ben Ali’s reelection, while his colleague, Slim Boukhdhir, was brutally assaulted. Several journalists were attacked and others received death threats in Gabon following President Ali Bongo’s reelection. Around six media were also temporarily shut down for reporting on the post-election violence and criticising members of the new government. Protests about President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial reelection in Iran prompted a horrifying wave of repression against the media.

Pluralist elections that should be a symbol of democracy and free expression can turn into a nightmare for journalists. State media are too often prevented from giving fair and balanced coverage of all the candidates’ campaigns. Such was the case during the contentious Afghan elections and the travesty of an election in Equatorial Guinea. The most committed journalists can be exposed to reprisals from a rival camp. Media access is not always properly observed, as evidenced in provincial polling in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.

The most serious problems arise when results are announced. Overwhelmed by an opposition movement that was relayed online and in the reformist press, Ahmadinejad’s supporters launched an ultra-violent crackdown on hundreds of journalists and bloggers, accusing them of being spies in the pay of foreigners or bent on destabilising the country.

The courage shown by journalists this year before and after elections earned them periods in custody, mistreatment and prison sentences that were in some cases extremely harsh. These post-election crackdowns should stimulate the international community to seek better ways of protecting the press after rigged election results are announced.

“This wave of violence bodes ill for 2010, when crucial elections are scheduled in Côte d’Ivoire, Sri Lanka, Burma, Iraq and the Palestinian Territories” said Reporters Without Borders, which often carries out media monitoring during election campaigns.

More than 100 bloggers and cyber-dissidents imprisoned
For the first time since the Internet’s emergence, Reporters Without Borders is aware of more than 100 bloggers and cyber-dissidents being imprisoned worldwide for posting their opinions online. This figure is indicative above all of the scale of the crackdown being carried out in around ten countries. Several countries have turned online expression into a criminal offence, dashing hopes of a censorship-free Internet.

The Internet has been the driving force for pro-democracy campaigns in Iran, China and elsewhere. It is above all for this reason that authoritarian governments have shown themselves so determined to severely punish Internet users. This is the case with two Azerbaijani bloggers, who were sentenced to two years in prison for making a film mocking the political elite.

Although China continued to be the leading Internet censor in 2009, Iran, Tunisia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam and Uzbekistan have also resorted to frequent blocking of websites and blogs and surveillance of online expression. The Turkmen Internet remains under total state control. This year, bloggers and ordinary citizens expressing themselves online have been assaulted, threatened or arrested as the popularity of social-networking and interactive websites has soared. Egyptian blogger Kareem Amer is still in jail, while the famous Burmese comedian Zarganar still has 34 years of his prison sentence to serve. The approximately 120 victims of Internet policing also include such leading figures in the defence of online free expression as China’s Hu Jia and Liu Xiaobo and Vietnam’s Nguyen Trung and Dieu Cay. The financial crisis has joined the list of subjects likely to provoke censorship, particularly online. In South Korea, a blogger was wrongfully detained for commenting on the country’s disastrous economic situation. Around six netizens in Thailand were arrested or harassed just for making a connection between the king’s health and a fall in the Bangkok stock exchange. Censorship was slapped on the media in Dubai when it came for them to report on the country’s debt repayment problems.

Democratic countries have not lagged far behind. Several European countries are working on new steps to control the Internet in the name of the battle against child porn and illegal downloads. Australia has said it will set up a compulsory filtering system that poses a threat to freedom of expression. Turkey’s courts have increased the number of websites, including YouTube, that are blocked for criticising the republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. “The number of countries affected by online censorship has doubled from one year to the next – a disturbing tendency that shows an increase in control over new media as millions of netizens get active online,” said Lucie Morillon, head of the Internet and Freedoms Desk. “That is why Reporters Without Borders will launch a new campaign against the Enemies of the Internet on 12 March.”

Media on trial
At least 167 journalists are in prison around the world at the end of 2009. One would need to go back to the 1990s to find so many of them in jail. Although the UN special rapporteur on freedom of expression keeps reiterating that imprisonment is a disproportionate punishment for press offences, many governments keep laws that allow them to jail journalists, and continue to abuse these laws. The sentences given to journalists in Cuba, China, Sri Lanka and Iran are as harsh as those imposed for terrorism or violent crime.

Imprisonment and brutality are too often the only way authorities react to journalists. At least one journalist is assaulted or arrested every day in the Middle East. More than 60 journalists were physically attacked or arrested in Iraq in 2009. In the Palestinian Territories, more than 50 journalists were detained by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and by Fatah in the West Bank. Africa and Asia were neck and neck in the numbers of journalists detained. More than 10 journalists were arrested in 2009 in Niger, Gambia and Somalia, while Eritrea maintained its dubious distinction of jailing the most journalists in Africa, with 32 of them behind bars. In Asia, arrests are thankfully down, but the Chinese and Pakistani security forces continue to arrest foreign or local journalists when they crossed the “red lines” they are supposed to observe.

The 28 June coup in Honduras, which was backed by the conservative press, resulted in the persecution of journalists suspected of sympathizing with the ousted president, Manuel Zelaya, and the suspension or permanent closure of their media. Finally, Cuba drew attention to itself again this year with at least 24 arrests and two new long jail sentences, bringing to 25 the number of journalists in prison.

When the powerful are not arresting journalists, they are harassing them by constantly dragging them before the courts. One editor in Algeria, Omar Belhouchet, was summoned before judges 15 times in 2009. The opposition press in Turkey and Morocco have been bombarded with law suits, which almost always lead to convictions or closures because the courts are more inclined to favour the plaintiff than the media.

Choosing exile to stay Alive
For the first time, the Reporters Without Borders annual roundup includes figures for journalists who have been forced to leave their countries because of threats to their lives or liberty. A total of 157 journalists went into exile in the past year, often in very harsh conditions. Among the countries where the exodus of journalists and bloggers was particularly dramatic were Iran, with more than 50 fleeing, and Sri Lanka, with 29. In Africa, some 50 journalists fled the chaos in Somalia while scores of Eritreans sought refuge abroad for fear of being targeted for reprisals by the continent’s worst dictatorship. Journalists also fled Guinea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, Colombia and Ethiopia.

This new measure is an indication of the level of fear that exists within the media in some countries. Journalists encounter many hazards as they go into exile and seek an uncertain future. Some wait months, even years, to get protection and possible resettlement.

See also:
>The report in PDF
> Impunity, war and elections behind journalists killed in 2009, IFEX, Jan 6, 2010.

As a journalist writing regularly on climate change issues and having focused some of your reporting on the recent climate change summit held in Copenhagen, how would you assess the Summit process and its outcome?
The UN climate processes are often known to be quite complicated and tardy but given that they have to bring together nearly 200 countries for a consensus, it’s not going to be easy either. The Copenhagen summit proved to be even more chaotic because initially there were two rival groups– developing countries pushing for the Kyoto process and developed countries trying to dump the 1997 treaty, which will expire in 2012. While the deadlock kept the conference going nowhere for almost two weeks, towards the end an even more messy turn took place. The US, that had other developed countries rallying behind it for the end of the Kyoto protocol, struck a deal with Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC countries that are with the pro-Kyoto G77 plus China bloc) and brought out the Copenhagen accord. Since it was done outside of the official UN system, many developing countries cried foul and most developed countries were left red-faced.

The marriage of convenience– between the US and the BASIC countries– proved that these were the countries that wanted no binding climate treaty. While some developing countries were asking the conference chair not to get the accord within the UN climate regime, parties to the accord like China were saying that the number of countries supporting the agreement will increase in the days to come. In his last press meet during this conference, I asked the UN Framework Convention of Climate Change Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer how many countries had supported the accord and now many were against. He had no figures, and rather went on to explain the UN climate system. It is this confusion the Copenhagen summit has been able to bring about– jeopardizing the future course under the UN regime for a legally binding climate treaty that could address global warming.

There were some concerns that many journalists did not get enough access to the summit proceedings as well as the fact that some media, particularly in the West, did not prioritize climate change coverage in their outlets. What is your impression of their performance in the whole process leading up to the summit?
We did get to hear about some media organizations that did not get accreditation but it was said that they had applied quite late. I don’t know what the fact is. But for the journalists who were already in the conference, I think the UN had reasonably effective system to disseminate information– be it through live webcast, broadcast, press meets and even recorded documents. A leak apparently by the UN in the final days of the conference even helped the media understand that whatever figures major emitters were putting on the table for carbon cuts would lead to an average global temperature increase of three degrees– a recipe for major catastrophes. The western media, in general, did cover the summit with due importance. But, coverage by some journalists from both developed and few fast developing nations were quite focused on their countries. At times, that resulted into biased reports supporting their delegates’ position while criticizing or downplaying others’ sayings. In some cases, it was jingoistic journalism. Reporters who relied too much on their countries’ delegates pushing their own agenda ended up hugging tress and missed the forest.

How about climate change coverage in Nepal’s media; print, broadcast and online? What do you think are our strengths and weaknesses in covering this emerging issue?
Nepal’s coverage of climate change issues, I must say, is at nascent stage, more so in broadcast media. Given the political instability and the crucial phase the peace process is in, it is to some extent understandable that climate related issues get overshadowed. We can have some first hand accounts when it comes to covering climate change impacts that will affect millions of people in the South Asian region, That can be one of our strengths. Water resources is one such example. But treating climate as a ceremonial issue (that is paying attention to it only when conferences take place or, say, when the world is observing environment day) has been our greatest weakness. The media need to wake up to the fact that it is an issue about our lives and the issue has to be conveyed effectively to the people.

Given that this is a specialty field of journalism, we often hear that it is a challenging beat. What has been your experience? In what ways is it challenging?
Climate science has just begun to unfold and even scientists are still scratching their heads trying to make sense of the changes and understanding what the increasing concentration of carbon dioxide gas in the atmosphere has in store for us. While the science is already complicated, global politics and economic competition makes it all the more difficult. “Security” was the first choice of word of the US President Barrack Obama when he tried to explain what climate change meant for his country during the Copenhagen summit. World leaders went to the Danish capital last month to see a new climate treaty but returned having witnessed a new global order– the alliance between the US and emerging economies like China and India while other developed countries were left out in the cold. Given all this, making sense of what is happening in the world of climate change is indeed quite challenging and even more demanding is the job to explain it to general people. More so, to those in the least developed countries. And then it is in the same countries where there is virtually no research on climate change and its impact, which also make our work even more taxing.

How can Nepal’s media improve climate change reporting?
Editors will have to get it high on their agenda and allow their reporters and columnists to specialize on the issue. Environmental organizations and groups will have to do much more to educate journalists and perhaps universities will have to start offering appropriate courses. Journalists on their part will have to give their 100 percent to understand this global issue in a bid to relate it locally. They should be able to sell it also as economic, political or even security issues– because they are. If they just think it in terms of environment– it will remain there somewhere in inside pages and editors will bring them out only on world environment day. True that media need to cater to general interests. But in our parts of the world we also need to create the much-lacking awareness in climate change, and once that happens people will certainly look for climate stories because they will then have begun to realize that it is about their livelihood and their future generation.

What can or should policy making agencies and the academia do in prioritizing and fostering climate change reporting in Nepal?
Conduct researches in as many areas as possible and share the results with the media. At the moment, we only get to hear sporadic studies on glacial meltdown and the rapid filling up of lakes in the Himalayas. What’s happening to biodiversity, rainfall and crop patterns, farm outputs, or, say, spread of diseases? The scientific community and policy makers could perhaps take cue from reports filed by journalists, even if they are not specialized on the topic. It could serve as a lead for further research.

What is your impression of Nepal’s analytical writing on the topic, such as commentaries and op-eds? How does that compare with broadcast programs on the subject?
As I am based in London, I am not in a position to monitor all that is broadcast from Nepal. But going by the print media, even opinions and analysis on the issue are quite rare. One area that some experts have focused in this context is agriculture. For instance, The Kathmandu Post columnist Anil Bhattarai, has been writing quite regularly on it. Officials from Weather Forecast division also write from time to time and I wish more was done by others, especially experts and scientists.

Can you cite some examples of great stories on climate change coming out of Nepal?
I am thinking hard. Yes, Nepali Times editor Kunda Dixit recently wrote a piece quite effectively showing climate change is real and is happening in Nepal as well. His writing took readers to places as if they were traveling with him and witnessing for themselves how the changes were taking place and what dangers lie ahead.

How about climate change topics that need serious consideration in our context?
As I explained earlier, many other areas– and not just Himalayan glaciers- need serious attention. We simply don’t know what is happening in those areas while scientific arguments and experiences elsewhere show that changes in other areas like biodiversity, water availability, human health, among others, are imminent.

What have been some of your own fulfilling experiences in climate change reporting and writing?
I wish I could do more of spot reporting as I did from the Everest region in 2006 when freak weather suddenly hit and it snowed heavily even during spring and I developed pulmonary edema (a kind of high altitude sickness) and had to be air lifted. For someone who had been there to make a BBC World Service documentary on the risks Himalayan porters take to reach people from across the globe to the highest places on the Earth, what better experience? Story-wise, it was in 2008 when I was covering the 14th UN climate conference in Poznan, Poland when I could expose a dogfight between the United Nations Development Program and the Global Environment Facility that led to the delay of the preparation of Nepal’s climate change adaptation plan. It was after I got the exclusive investigative piece out, the two donors patched up and the deadline for the preparation of the plan was extended for Nepal.

I have been regularly writing for the BBC Science and Environment online for more than five years now and since last year I have been designated as Environment Reporter, BBC News. Reporting climate issues for the BBC Nepali service is quite satisfying as I can reach millions of those very rural people who are already bearing the brunt of climate impacts but have no idea about climate change. It has been almost one year since I began writing a column “London Calling” for The Kathmandu Post, mostly focusing on climate and the response has been tremendous. But I know I should not be complacent, I have much more to learn and do.

Could you offer some professional tips—some dos and don’ts for climate change reporters?
As I said I myself am learning… But at least what I can say is that this is a very profound subject and reporters will have to take a complete and holistic dip into it. It means rigorous study of the subject and following global developments– both of the science and politics. And, of course, keeping tab of local issues is also equally important, only then you will be able to relate global and the local pictures. Reporters tend to label every weather story as climate change report, which is often not correct. Reason: Weather is a short-term event while climate change is a pattern which demands some time and periodic observation of experts.

You are currently a climate change reporting fellow? Could you explain what it entails and what you have been doing as a fellow?
I have been a Climate Change Media Partnership (CCMP) fellow for the last two years. The fellowship meant that I could cover the 14th and the 15th UN climate conference. It has helped me stay in touch with national and international experts, scientists, negotiators and officials. It has enabled me to to follow the directions and developments in climate change politics or international negotiations. The fellowship has more than forty journalists from around the world and that means I can follow what is happening in their respective countries on climate issues and how that affects the rest of the world. Basically it has been a great networking.

What led or inspired you to cover climate change?
Environment has been one area I have been consistently and intensively covering since I began journalism more than one and a half decade ago. Wildlife used to be my favorite beat, and I have slept in caves in trans-Himalayan region to investigate, for instance, poaching of Snow leopard. But over the years I have witnessed how climate change is changing our natural environment, and that is how I was drawn into covering this phenomenal global issue. With so much of regional and global politics increasingly surrounding it, as a journalist, there is no looking back, I guess.

Relevant Links
> Watch a video clip of Navin at CCMP here.
> Links to his articles at CCMP.
> BBC News Nepali homepage.

###

Knowledge (see note 1) is more than data or information available readily in an organization. It is a fluid mix of framed experiences, values, contextual information, and expert insights that provide a conceptual framework for evaluating, and incorporating new experiences and information to stay on top of the competitive market. Data and information are important, but knowledge is more valuable to the organization because somebody has given the data and information a context, a meaning, a particular interpretation, and added their own wisdom to it and has considered its larger implications. Knowledge derives from the minds at work. It exists within people, part and partial of human complexity and unpredictability. If information is to become knowledge, humans must do virtually all the work. Knowledge develops over time through experience that we absorb from books, courses, mentors, training, or informal learning such as apprenticeship. It provides the historical perspective on our own understanding and perception of situations or events or things which includes values and beliefs of the person who posses it directly or derived from the person who passed the knowledge. Knowledge creation is the result of the activities that take place between and within humans through verbal (dialogue or monologue) or non-verbal communication or observation or any other means.

Types of Knowledge
Based on communicability Michael Polanyi (a philosopher) postulated knowledge into two broad conceptual categories, namely, explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge.

Explicit knowledge can be expressed in words and/or numbers, hence can be codified into books, documents, or journals electronically or in traditional methods. An example on explicit knowledge would be the understanding what makes a phone ring or why the sun sets.

Such knowledge can be processed, stored in a database and transmitted across individuals formally and systematically in the form of hard copy or soft copy. Explicit knowledge relates to know-what (about facts) and know-why (scientific principles and laws) components of knowledge.

On the other hand, tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in each individual’s experiences, ideals, beliefs, emotions and actions. Such knowledge provides a historical perspective from which to view and understand new situations and events. How to restore telephone services in case of natural disaster or who can provide the direction where the technology is heading: these are some of the examples of tacit knowledge. The tacit knowledge is developed and internalized by the person who posses it over a long period. It is a complex knowledge that cannot be codified effectively into a document. Tacit knowledge is the knowledge chiefly pertaining to know-how (special skill or ability to act) and know-who (who knows what and who knows how to act) components of the knowledge that people acquire through years of practical experience.

It should now be clear that explicit knowledge could be gained by employing people with right educational degree and providing training to its staff. However, tacit knowledge is embedded in a person with experience. It should be tacit knowledge that a company should try to focus more. When a company hires a new staff fresh from a university, the company is increasing the capacity in explicit knowledge repository, but if an experience staff leaves the company it is not only loosing its capacity in explicit knowledge, but also its loosing its repository of tacit knowledge.

Knowledge Management
Knowledge creation must be the most important objectives of an organization. Hiring experts is the easiest way of creating knowledge repository in a company. Best suitable experts may not be available when required and certainly are very expensive to hire. Furthermore, such an external expert may not have a full understanding of the company’s norms and culture, which may result in dissatisfaction across the company. Hence, it is essential that a company make use of the existing knowledge within the company as knowledge management.

It may sound that terms “Knowledge” and “Management” are oxymoron, one contradicts which with the other. It has been a general trend in traditional companies to hoard knowledge and other assets believing that scarcity creates value. The unwillingness to share information, for example, is cultural. After all, for us, what could be more personal, more our own, than our own thoughts? Such culture was more prevalent in western world and presumes its still exists in South Asian countries like Nepal too.

Hewlett Pack (the American IT giant company before the merger with Compaq) CEO Lew Platt once said, “If HP knew what HP knows, we would be three times more profitable”. He was referring to the knowledge shared by his corporate executives. This is often the case in many organizations.

In contrary, countries like Japan have quite a different culture. They believe in sharing knowledge. Management researchers have contributed to Japan’s innovativeness and such a culture of sharing knowledge. Sharing knowledge is not about giving people something, or getting something from them. That is only valid for information sharing. Sharing knowledge occurs when people are genuinely interested in helping one another to develop new capacities for action; it is about creating learning processes collaboratively. They believe that if the knowledge one possesses is not known or accessible to others, it really does not add any value to the company or to the self.

In order to encourage people to share knowledge, employees should perceive that hoarding knowledge is not adding value to their career paths. A belief system that encourages people to share knowledge among peers within an organization from which the employee sees benefit in doing so is essential. The modern organization must focus on sharing knowledge. It is senior management’s responsibility to foster an organizational culture of knowledge sharing rather than knowledge hoarding. Unbiased human resources system that acknowledges knowledge sharing with rewards and recognition and that abhors knowledge hoarding with punishment will foster knowledge sharing culture within the company.

Besides culture, technological infra-structure and informal structure such as communities of practice are important factors for successful knowledge sharing. Technology helps communicate and store knowledge where possible. Community of practice helps to bring people of similar interest and minds together without any formal obligations or commitments. The subscription of such community should be voluntary and so open that it may include current employees, customers, vendors, partners, ex-employees from any rank and level. Knowledge can come from anywhere.

Conclusion
Nepal Telecom has been operating as a company for about 4 years but before that as a corporation for nearly 4 decades. Over this period, the company has invested humongous amount of money in its financial capital. (Most of them may have been depreciated and become redundant.) What one may not realize is that there are people who are adding their values to these investments to milk the profit to the company. In the modern management terminology, it is known as human capital. There is no doubt that the company is investing in the development of the human capital by training its staff in various topics. However, it is not evident if there is a clear strategy on optimizing the investment in knowledge management.

Knowledge has been regarded as one of the strongest competitive advantages in modern economy. Modern companies should focus on developing the company for future rather for today. To do so, NT needs to be more innovative and adaptive, if NT has to continue to be leading the sector in the country. With the right structure, technology, culture and human resources policy, NT can benefit from its human capital and gain competitive advantage in the market for sustainable period.

Binita Shrestha is a Deputy Manager at Nepal Telecom. This article is adapted, courtesy of the publication released to mark the fifth anniversary of the company.

Note
1. Davenport, T. H. and Prusak, L., 2000, Working Knowledge: How Organisations Manage What They Know, Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard Business School Press.

###

These are suggestive and representative of the major stories that thrust the country into spotlight this past year, locally and sometimes globally. These were randomly selected by NM editors, based on their salience in the public domain.

The peace process, which took an unwelcome turn following the fall of the Maoist-led government on 4 May 2009, was the top news story of the year. The faltering economy was the second top story.

Public Security/Health Epidemics were voted by the editors as the third top story, followed by extended power outages (as many as 16 hours a day), which affected common lives as well as industrial productivity, the climate change buzz, Gadhimai sacrifices/Pashupatinath temple row, disasters (Koshi boat capsize, forest fires, bus accidents, etc.) Vice-president Oath Row/Narayanhiti Palace/Khagendra Thapa Magar, Christians on the Spotlight/Attack on Media, and Tibet/China factor.

The Monitor editors also identified other major stories that missed the top 10 in the list.

The following are 2009’s top 10 stories as voted by the editors of Nepal Monitor:
#1. Peace Process Debacle: The country’s peace process took a u-turn following the Maoists’ firing of Nepal’s Chief of Army Staff Rukmagat Katuwal and his reinstatement to the post by President Ram Baran Yadav. Puspa Kamal Dahal, who led the coalition government, quit on May 4 over failed bid to fire Katuwal, calling for “civilian supremacy.” The unlikely comeback newsmaker was Madhav Kumar Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). He was elected the new premier by lawmakers on May 23. As new political alliances emerged, the gulf between political parties widened and public disillusionment continued to be exacerbated, even as the call for consensus became louder and fruitless, and these cast increasing doubts about the main agenda of the transitional process— Constitution-making.

The Maoist change in posture— starting with the infamous Prachadagate video and characterized by blockage and disruption of parliamentary sessions, phase-wise protests, continued killings, intimidation of media and other public or professional bodies, their unilateral declarations of autonomous regions in the country, their call for dialogue with India to resolve Nepal’s political deadlock, etc.—overshadowed the peace process. Other political parties came under fire for their incapability to address the Maoist demands and embrace a consensus politics, or to form a national unity government. There were also protests by other ethnic groups, such as the Tharus, Rais, and Limbus. Other stakeholders in the peace process, such as the United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) also came under fire from political parties for being too lenient to the Maoist positions.

#2. The Economy: Unnatural and sustained rise in food prices and real estate, coupled with a bearish NEPSE, with the index early December laying the lowest (down to -3.15%) since May 2007, and liquidity crisis in the banking sector dominated the news, pointing to the economic woes of country with a poverty rate of 32 percent and unemployment rate as high as 42 percent. In the first quarter of 2009-10, according to the Nepal Rastra Bank, the country’s exports had declined (17 percent) and imports continued to soar (30 percent).

Although, in the first two months of the current fiscal year inflation became moderate (9.7 percent as against 13.5 percent during the same period last year) prices of consumer goods skyrocketed, as much as 43.5 percent for fruits and vegetables. Foreign remittance, the backbone of the nation’s economy, was hit hard, with its growth rate slowing down dramatically. According to a NRB report, there was a 19.7 percent increase in remittance during the period as against 59.4 percent during the same period in 2008. Trade deficit reached Rs 73.77 billion, 48.6 percent up from 2008.

#3. Public Security/ Health Epidemics: Among the many cases of kidnapping and murders, the case of Khyati Shrestha stood out. The young woman’s kidnapping and brutal murder shocked the country. As the law and order situation worsened with the rise in cases of child-kidnapping, many groups and people took the law in their hands. In many cases innocent people were lynched or killed on mere suspicion of being kidnappers. On July 7, three students in Bhaktapur were lynched to death in one such mob attack. In another case, a woman was burnt alive by a mob in Dhanusa, southern Nepal (April 12) after she was accused of trying to kidnap a toddler

The Jajarkot diarrhea epidemic, the deadly bird flu strain and the swine flu scare also collectively stood at #4. The first case of the deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu was confirmed in early January 2009, which triggered panic in the poultry industry. The government declared an emergency and thousands of chickens were slaughtered in the southern districts and poultry consumption almost came to a standstill for several months.

The diarrhea epidemic which broke out in the remote western district of Jajarkot and spread to other adjoining 19 districts killed more than 280 people. The problem was compounded by difficult geography, monsoon reason, and poor access as well as inefficient government relief efforts. Worse, the region was already reeling under food shortage.

The global swine flu strain also arrived in Nepal. The Ministry of Health in late 2009 confirmed 150 cases of AH1N1 across the country. At least one death from the flu was reported.

#4. Power Outages: Closely following health epidemics was the story on power cuts—as many as 16 hours a day during the peak winter season. The outage--which has dominated news for several years--adversely affected not only daily lives of ordinary people living in urban and semi-urban areas but also many enterprises relying on electricity. It even affected the media industry: For several months, beginning in January, all private television stations in the country stopped broadcasting their programs past mid-night until 5 am, citing power cuts. No alternatives were developed although last year the Maoist-led government had proposed setting up thermal plants to avert the crisis. Lacking policies to ensure investments in infrastructure development, Nepal is currently able only about 2 percent of its total hydroelectricity capacity of and estimated 83,000 MW.

#5. Climate Change/Environment: The first major regional climate change conference in Himalayan nations was organized in Kathmandu on Aug 31. Nepal’s cabinet met near Mt. Everest (Kalapathar plateau, 5,262 meters, the Himalayas), the highest altitude such meeting in human history, on December 4, to highlight the issue of retreating mountain glaciers due to climate change. This has been a real concern to policymakers ever since a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)-backed scientific study in 2002 found that the glacier near Mt. Everest had retreated by around five kilometers up the mountain. The meeting received global media attention. The Sagarmatha Declaration called on the world to preserve the Himalayas. It was followed by Nepal’s large presence at the Copenhagen summit (Dec 7-18).

Related stories included the news on the discovery of some 353 new species in the Eastern Himalayas, and continued efforts to manage garbage in the capital city.

#6. Gadhimai Sacrifices/Pashupatinath Row: Toward the end of the year, November 24-25, more than 250,000 animals were sacrificed at the Gadhimai temple, in Bara district of south-central Nepal, in a centuries-old tradition—described as the world's biggest ritual slaughter. The event is organized every five years, but this year it got unprecedented news coverage in both local and international media, mainly because of protests spearheaded by animal rights activists. Several animal rights groups, including prominent personalities or celebrities from abroad like Brigitte Bardot of France and Maneka Gandhi of India as well as Ram Bahadur Bomjon (the Buddha Body) from home joined the appeal and the protest campaign in an effort to stop the sacrifices. But the authorities did little to stop it and organizers went ahead, arguing that animal sacrifice is part of religious and traditional beliefs and cannot be stopped.

The other story on the #6 slot was the Pashupatinath temple priest row. The Maoist-led government forced three Indian priests of Pashupatinath--one of Hinduism’s most revered temples--to resign in late December 2008. The government appointed Nepali scholars in their place. In the new year, the move sparked widespread protests from other political parties, Nepali priests of the temple and civil society groups. Since the last 300 years, Nepal has recruited south Indian priests to head the temple ceremonies. The controversy was widely reported in the Indian media as well. After nearly two weeks and a Supreme Court challenge against the new appointments, the government withdrew its appointment of two head priests.

#7. Disasters: Landslides, floods, bus accidents, forest fires and boat capsizes were some of the major disasters. In August at least 7 people died in floods in Jhapa district, and thousands were displaced. In the first week of October, 34 people lost their lives in landslides in Dailekh, Achham, Bajhang, Kailali and Doti, in western Nepal. There were also floods in Nepalgunj and near Rapti river.

Bus accidents, as in the previous years, also comprised majority of disaster stories. More than 80 people were killed in such accidents across the country. A sample: Baitadi (10 killed; March 1), Gaindakot, Nawalparasi (3 killed; July 24), Jaibire, Sindhupalchowk, Sun Koshi river (18 killed; Sept 10), Sukute, Sindhupalchowk, Sun Koshi river (20 killed; Sept 25), Lahan (2 killed; Sept 25), Palpa (6 killed; Oct 7), Mahendranagar (2 killed; Oct 26), Hanshapur, Arghakhanchi (16 killed; Nov 8), Pokhara (2 killed; Nov 8), Gaindakot, Nawalparasi (8 killed; Nov 10), Aabukhaireni, Tanahu (1 killed; Nov 12), among others.

On April 23, 13 Nepal Army men were killed while fighting forest fire in Ramechhap district. Two days later, 6 people were burnt to death in Gulmi while trying to put out a fire in the Hastichaur community forest. On 4 January, at least two people drowned after a crowded ferry capsized in Koshi river in eastern Nepal. On March 9, four teenaged students, including three girls, were killed in another boat capsize in Koshi.

#8. Vice-president Oath Row/Narayanhiti Palace/Khagendra Thapa Magar: These three stories competed for the #8 slot.

VP Paramanand Jha on July 23 took the oath of his office in Hindi. After much public criticism and a Supreme Court order of Aug. 12 to take his oath of office and secrecy in Nepali, he declined to do so and his post remains defunct to this day.

The Narayanhiti, the former royal palace and the site of the infamous massacre of 2001, was turned into a national museum in late February, nine months after monarchy was abolished. Several months later, it opened for public viewing, drawing in large crowds.

The 50 cm tall Khagendra Thapa Magar, 18, remained in media spotlight both at home and abroad, as the shortest person in Nepal, and possibly the shortest man in the world. His campaign to include himself as the shortest man in the Guinness Book of World Records became successful by mid-December. However, he was still striving to compete for another title—the lightest man in the world. He weighs only 4.5 kg.

#9. Christians on the Spotlight/Attack on Media: The minority Christian community in Nepal faced two tragedies that thrust them into unprecedented media spotlight. On May 23, two people were killed in a church at Lalitpur packed with worshippers when a bomb exploded. Religious communities in Nepal were rarely before fatally targeted by groups. A Hindu extremist group called the National Defense Army claimed the responsibility. On September 29, 23 people were killed and some 65 injured when a makeshift church building in Dharan, eastern Nepal, collapsed. A positive spotlight was seen in December during Christmas—the media, now under a secular environment, gave unprecedented coverage to the festivities.

The other #9 story was attacks on the media, most prominently highlighted in the killing of Janakpur-based journalist Uma Singh on January 11. There were many other cases of intimidations of journalists by Maoist and other groups across the country. Another case involved the arrest in early February of journalist Rishi Dhamala and his and imprisonment. Police charged Dhamala had links with the extremist outfit Ranabir Sena. He was released in April. Two other journalists Ram Shuvak Mahato and Birendra KM remain in jail. The Supreme Court on Dec 27 ordered both be released on general bail. By the end of the year, in mid-December Tika Bista, a journalist based in Rukum was brutally attacked allegedly by Maoist cadres.

#10. The Tibet/China Factor: Tibetan refuges living in Nepal organized series of protests against China, demanding the freedom of their homeland. These protests, which continued for several months intermittently, were sometimes participated in by thousands of Tibetans and some turned violent. There was an increasing pressure on Nepal from China to suppress the demonstrators which received widespread international media attention. Tensions between China and India began to emerge and both seemed concerned over their interests in Nepal. China’s more overt policy manifestations in recent times also added to this new posturing, which affected Nepal’s politics as well.

Other major stories, some of which just missed the top 10, included (in no particular order):
- Madhav Kumar Nepal assigned chair of the Constitutional Commission (Jan 13)
- Nepal government banned `Chandni Chowk to China' (Jan 22)- there was public protest over the fact that the movie has a claim that Buddha was born in India
- US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard A. Boucher visited Nepal (Feb 11)
- Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa cut short his three-day state visit to Nepal (March 3) after the attack on his country’s cricket team in Pakistan. He re-visited Nepal on Oct 29.
- First woman deputy PM Shailaja Acharya died (June 12)
- Apa Sherpa reached Mt. Everest summit for record 19th time (June 17)
- Nepal Rastra Bank governor row- After a protracted trial the Supreme Court reinstated (in late July) Bijaya Nath Bhattarai to the governor’s post. Since June 2007, Bhattarai had remained suspended from his post under corruption charges
- Joanna Lumley, “the goddess of the Gurkhas”, visited Nepal (end of July)
- Govt announced incentives for widows in August; the move sparked protests by women
- Chhatra Man Singh Gurung appointed Chief of Army Staff (Sept 9)--he is the first Nepali from the ethnic group to head the Army.
- Store clerk Pankaj Joshi accused of stealing US$1 million lottery prize in the US (Oct.)
- Nepal and India renewed trade treaty (Oct 27)
- First Nepali solar car by 16 year old Kushal KC from Baglung district (late Oct.)
- Government passed budget (Nov 25) after months of Maoist seize of parliament
- Min Bahadur Sherchan, 78, recognized by Guinness Book of World Records as the oldest man to climb Mt. Everest
- Facebook and Twitter mania: The social networking phenomena catch up in Nepal
- Foreign trips and junkets by political leaders, including Prachanda and Madhav Kumar Nepal
- The cabinet decided to nominate Girija Prasad Koirala for Nobel Peace Prize (December)

(You could suggest other major stories of the year that might have been left out in this suggestive list. You can simply post them as comments below. Thank you!)

###

PM Nepal with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. Photo courtesy of Xinhua

Joint Press Release issued by Nepal-China in Beijing

At the invitation of Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal of Nepal paid an official visit to China December 26 to 31, 2009.

During the visit, Prime Minister Nepal called on President Hu Jintao and National People's Congress Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo and held talks with Premier Wen Jiabao. In a sincere and friendly atmosphere, the leaders of the two countries had an in-depth exchange of views and reached extensive understanding on the development of Nepal-China relations as well as on international and regional issues of mutual interest.

The two sides reviewed the time-honoured Nepal-China friendly relations and exchanges, and noted with satisfaction that since the establishment of the diplomatic relations in 1955, Nepal-China relations have withstood changes of the international situation and have been growing in a consistent, steady and healthy manner. The characteristics of relationship are equality, harmonious coexistence and everlasting friendship.

The two sides maintained that good neighbourly friendship and deepening of mutually beneficial cooperation serve the fundamental interests of the two countries, meet the common aspirations of the two peoples and are conducive to peace and development in the region and the world at large. The two sides decided to establish and develop a Nepal-China Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation featuring ever-lasting friendship on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

The two sides agreed to respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as each other's social system and development path chosen in the light of their respective national conditions, and respect and understand each other's major concerns and core interests. The two sides will adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence, non-alignment and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, develop all round friendly exchanges and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefits, share development experience, and embrace opportunities, and vigour to their good neighbourly and friendly cooperation, enhance everlasting friendship and achieve common development.

The two sides agreed to further promote exchange of high-level visits and contacts at all levels and make full use of the existing mechanisms, including the diplomatic consultation, the Nepal-China Joint Economic Committee Meeting, the Non-governmental Cooperation Forum and to expand exchanges and cooperation among government departments, parliaments, parties, local governments and business communities of the two countries.

Both sides believed that economic and trade cooperation is an important part of the Nepal-China Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation. The two sides agreed to further intensify cooperation in trade, investment, information technology, transportation, agriculture, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation and other fields on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The leaders also agreed to direct the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism between the two countries to review all dimensions of our bilateral cooperation, explore new areas of cooperation, coordinate and facilitate actions and make recommendations for further consideration at the higher levels.

The Nepalese side expressed thanks to the Chinese side for the long- standing valuable assistance for Nepal's economic development, extended a warm welcome to Chinese businesses to actively participate in hydropower construction and infrastructure development in Nepal and expressed readiness to cooperate with China to discuss the establishment of special economic zones in Nepal and attract Chinese companies for investment and development there.

The Chinese side stated that the Chinese Government encourages and supports competent and well-established Chinese companies to invest in Nepal. The Chinese side will provide necessary support and assistance to the Nepalese side in hydropower construction, infrastructure development, health, education, human resources development and other fields in the light of the economic and technical feasibilities of relevant projects. The Chinese side is ready to continue to provide assistance to Nepal within its ability and further carry out bilateral economic and technical cooperation and personnel exchanges to make positive contribution to its economic development in the changed context of Nepal.

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the implementation of various projects under Chinese assistance in diverse fields for the socio-economic development in Nepal. The Nepalese side stated that the continued and enhanced level of Chinese cooperation extended in the current transitional phase would be of additional significance to the people of Nepal. The Chinese side stated that China is mindful of the development challenges faced by Nepal and will provide appropriate encouragement, incentives as well as concessional financing to mutually agreed projects to the best of its ability. The Nepalese side expressed sincere appreciation for the kind gesture and understanding.

The Chinese side stated that it will gradually provide to Nepal zero-tariff treatment to 95% of the products, in accordance with its commitment made at the United Nations High-Level Event on the Millennium Development Goals. The two sides agreed to take measures to expand the bilateral trade and achieve sustained, steady and balanced development in the days ahead.

Both sides agreed to enhance various modes of connectivity such as land route and air services between the two countries to promote proximity and linkages, facilitate bilateral engagement and collaboration as well as enhance other economic opportunities and benefits including by improving land transportation infrastructure between the two countries.

The Chinese side stated that it supports Nepal's identification of agriculture as its priority area, and is ready to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with the Nepalese side in germplasm resources exchange, personnel training and joint cultivation of fine breeds and improved varieties. In this context, the Chinese side stands ready to provide assistance, within its capacity, to Nepalese agricultural institutes in terms of faculty and capacity building.

The two sides agreed to share experience and enhance cooperation in poverty alleviation. The Chinese side will help the Nepalese side to expedite the poverty reduction process in rural areas.

The two sides agreed to further expand the people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation with a view to promoting mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the two countries.

The two sides agreed to establish youth exchange programs on a sustainable basis, with the participation of youths from various walks of life. The number of participants will be gradually increased to 100 every year.

The Chinese side will continue to provide government scholarships to the Nepalese side. Students from Nepal are also welcome to study in China under various programmes and channels.

The two sides agreed to boost people-to-people contacts through the development of tourism and support the promotional measures of each in the other's country. The Chinese side agreed to actively encourage Chinese businesses to invest in and develop tourism infrastructure in Nepal.

The two sides agreed to promote contacts and exchanges between mass media, thinktanks, scholars and friendship groups of the two countries.

The two sides believed that the Tibet Autonomous Region of China and Nepal should give due recognition to their geographic proximity, establish more border trading points and strengthen exchanges among people in the border areas, in an effort to enhance traditional friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation.

The two sides believed that Nepal and China have identical or similar positions on major international issues such as global financial crisis, climate change, energy and food security as well as those relating to the aspirations and challenges of the developing countries. The two sides agreed to maintain close coordination and cooperation in this regard so as to uphold the common interests of both Nepal and China and other developing countries.

The two sides noted that the two countries always support and actively participate in UN peace-keeping operations. The two sides agreed to carry out exchanges and cooperation in this field.

The two sides view positively and support each other's participation in the regional cooperation processes, and agree to strengthen coordination and cooperation in various regional cooperation mechanisms.

The Nepalese side reiterated that there is but one China in the world, and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole China. Both Taiwan and Tibet are integral parts of the Chinese territory. The Nepalese side firmly supports efforts made by the Chinese side to uphold state sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, and will not allow any forces to use its territory to engage in any anti-China or separatist activities.

The Chinese side spoke highly of the above position of the Nepalese side and expressed firm support to the efforts made by the Nepalese side to uphold its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, national unity and stability. The Chinese side is pleased to see the progress made in the peace process in Nepal, and sincerely hopes that Nepal will realize peace, stability and prosperity.

The two sides believed that the official visit of Prime Minister Nepal to the People's Republic of China symbolized an enhanced level of Nepal-China relationship as well as a significant milestone in the history of cordial and cooperative relations between the two countries.

Prime Minister Nepal extended cordial invitation to President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders to pay official visits to Nepal at a mutually convenient time. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation and accepted the invitations with delight. The specific date of visits will be discussed through diplomatic channels.

On behalf of the government and people of Nepal, Prime Minister Nepal expressed his appreciation to the government and people of China for the warm and gracious hospitality accorded to him and his delegation.

The two sides signed the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Nepal and Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of People's Republic of China and the Government of Nepal on Youth Exchanges during the visit.

This joint press statement was issued in Beijing, on December 30, 2009.

###

And so the journalists listened to his fiery speech, in which he categorically said there was the need for dialogue to resolve the present deadlock in Nepal, but he would now only talk to the Indian “lords” in New Delhi to resolve the deadlock in the country. The local parties were only puppets in the hands of India. And so the journalists returned to their bases with the “big news” and reported his distrust with Nepal’s political leaders and highlighted his talking points throughout evening newscasts and in the morning banner headlines.

Dahal stated that he had actually begun the talks with India then and there from the podium. He even seemed to release the contents of his agenda, which the media faithfully highlighted: Abrogate the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, resolve Susta, Kalapani and border disputes, demand a fair transit deal, seek a strategic tripartite alliance among Nepal, India and China for economic development, begin new relations with India based on comprehensive historical review, among others.

Soon commentators and talking heads hit hard on the Maoist contradiction. On the one hand the Maoists never tire boasting about their nationalistic credentials and decrying external interference in Nepal’s politics. On the other, they were willing and openly declaring their desire to invite Indian interference into Nepal’s internal affairs.

That was clearly the news peg for all journalists, mitraharu or not. So they let it roll around their news cycles, with many repeats on broadcast channels.

It is not clear what Dahal wanted from the “patrakar mitraharu” other than news reports on what he said. But the reports soon seemed unhelpful for the Maoist chairman. When political parties began to decry his call for external interference and public outcry seemed imminent, Dahal backtracked. He told local media that he was only joking! His proposal to talk with India was “a kind of political satire”. His VP Narayankaji Shrestha chipped in: His remark was only a sarcasm against the government.

Dahal told the BBC that the local media had distorted the theme of his speech for propaganda and it was nothing less than yellow journalism. All day on Wednesday, the media-savvy orator had become a commentator on his own speech.

The irony is that Maoist bhatri media or sister news outlets covered the speech the same way as did the mainstream outlets of most of the so-called patrakar mitraharu. The Maoist online newsportal, for example, emphasized thus: Now the talks will be held with the real Lord India: Prachanda (in Nepali language) Nowhere in the body the article mentions Maoist efforts or willingness for local dialogue. It also does not clarify: Our Chairman’s talk of talks was merely a satire or sarcasm!

The other Maoist news outlets are no different. [See this, also in Nepali, which refers, in passing, to the futility of national dialogue. The English-language portal did not report the story, no updates as of mid-day, December 24, 2009).

It is fair to say that mainstream media, apart from the contradiction in Maoist approach to India, did report on Maoist take on the national dialogue efforts and their indefinite call for strike until dialogue is possible. It is not surprising that Maoists, who have for long manipulated Nepal’s media to their cause, would blame the messengers for their own outspokenness and mindless verbose.

This is but the latest example of Prachanda’s long known penchant for media-bashing to hide his own faults. Like any other arrogant political leader who thrives on manipulating the media, he reaches out to international media (this time the BBC) to not only appear clean but also to belittle the local media.

Nepal’s journalists have also fallen prey to their own news routines and values. They depend heavily on speech reporting to fill their increasingly widening newshole. The overemphasis on political reporting based solely on staged events means that they are often manipulated by vested interests. The opposition parties or the government also seems to have no strategy to counter this source-driven journalism. They don’t organize any press meets to counter even such controversial comments. Even for such fast-developing stories, journalists have to scramble around leaders’ hideouts or homes to get a bite or a quote to embolden the “reaction” punches in their dispatches. That is not always possible under deadlines.

Regular fact-checking by media themselves is another way to hold political speakers accountable to their verbose. Did the media distort Prachanda’s speech? Does the evidence suggest so?

There are more serious issues at stake for everyone in Nepal. Rather, why should not we ask more often these questions and why should not we make them more prominent issues today in Nepal: How do our leaders approach issues of dialogue and issues of resolving the present deadlock? How have the media covered the dialogue efforts? Will the constitution be written on time? What can help in that process? How can patrakar mitrahu truly prove to be friends and not foes of the political parties as well as the general public?

We would like to do more than just condemn the largest massacre of reporters in the history of journalism, because we have experienced increased violence against journalists in our own country. The latest is the brutal attack on journalist Tika Bista in Rukum.

Only a decade ago, before we took to violence and lost our innocence, such an incident at a far-away country would have simply ticked away from our headlines, unable to inspire our involvement, if not a brief attention for the incredible deviance in the news.

We now know that the news is more than just routine information and news gatherers far from indomitable intermediaries. In the past 9 years, we have seen in Nepal more than a dozen journalists killed, one after another, with total impunity and for political gains.

For one hundred year since the inception of classic Gorkhapatric journalism in 1901 and fifty years since the founding of independent press in the early 1950s, we endured moments of national shame now and then in arrests and torture of journalists, and in one prominent case, in the assassination attempt of the editor Padam Thakurathi in 1986. As a means of resistance and to gain political scores, we were nowhere close to openly embracing murder and violence against the press.

Suddenly, as we enter the new millennium trying to bring a closure to the decade-long war, we find ourselves among the many victims from around the world, who share our fears and anguish.

Stumbling towards a scientific future, we are in a simultaneous process of enhancing our humane and technical capabilities and retrieving our primitive, savage instincts.

Yet, targeted killing of journalists is a fairly recent phenomenon. According to the US media watchdog the Freedom Forum (FF), of the 1,976 journalists “who died or were killed while on assignment” since 1837, more than 58 percent (1,155) lost their lives between 1990 and 2009. [See Graph here, 1837-2009] In spite of deaths in crossfire, news persons were largely spared in earlier conflicts, mainly because they were widely considered neutral interlocutors, who also were armless. They were judged by the quality of their actual professional works—their detached reports—rather than by considering them “high value targets” for their public visibility or archetypes of freedom in this age.

The FF lists only 2 journalists killed in World War I (1914-1918). As the spiral of violence was unleashed and war reporting became chic, 68 journalists lost their lives in World War II (1939-1945). Sixty-six journalists were killed on assignment in the Vietnam War (1955-75). There was a spike in 1976-1977 in which 91 were killed, and all except 14 were among the “the disappeared ones” from Argentina, during the military rule there. During 1980-81, a total of 86 were killed, which also included “disappeared” Argentinean journalists.

The deadliest years so far are 1991 with 93 killings, and 1994 and 2007 with 94 each; a sharp spike since the mid-1990s.

Increasingly, journalists are murdered outside of conventional wars, in targeted and revenge killings or simply to silence the messengers or gain media hype. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), based in Washington DC, records that 549 of the 763 news professionals killed with confirmed motives since 1992 were actually murdered. A survey by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) found that 23 percent (274) of all the 1,192 journalists slain between 1990 and 2002 were killed in war zones. In recent years, targeted killing is seen even within the wider context of full-fledged wars, like in Iraq, where more than 250 journalists have been murdered since 2003, according to the Toronto-based International Freedom of Expression eXchange (IFEX).

If we also consider the data from the International News Safety Institute (INSI) in Brussels, which counts deaths of journalists as well as media support staff such as fixers, translators, and drivers, in conflict and non-conflict or disaster situations, the casualty figures are even higher. The INSI lists 2,077 killed since 1990.

In all these varied statistics, we see a steeply upward trend in the killings of news persons everywhere, including the Philippines. According to the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) in Manila, 134 journalists have been killed in the country since 1986, without accounting for the recent massacre. Of these 77 died in the line of duty. Although local sources put the toll up to two dozen, the FF counts 8 journalists killed in Nepal while on assignment whereas the INSI records 19 journalists killed since 2002. The CPJ reports 12 killed in Nepal.

The most alarming trend is the deliberate killings; 86 percent in Nepal and 95 percent in the Philippines, according to the CPJ. The CPJ data shows that less than 3 percent of all Filipino journalists killed since 1992 covered war as their beat. Most reported on politics, corruption, crime and human rights. Equally disturbing is the near-total impunity globally in such killings; 100 percent in Nepal, and 86 percent in the Philippines.

The Filipino experience suggests that just having a vigorous and regionally enviable press system--some of Asia’s best journalism institutions, including the one with the Magsaysay repute for the annual communication arts award, are based there--does not help secure safe working conditions for media professionals. Neither does a democracy or republic guarantee such conditions. The top 21 bloodiest countries during January 1996-June 2006, according to INSI, included both democracies or republics and dictatorships or repressive and conflict-ridden countries, from Iraq to Iran to India and Brazil to USA.

The classic view of journalists as neutral zones is seriously under threat. Today, reporters have to fight more of their professional battles outside of their texts, outside of their newsrooms, in the fields out there, within the many institutional constraints. In fact, we have entered the era of post-textual journalism, in which, increasingly, media actors and structures, and not the actual journalistic products, are read and contested within the frameworks of power and influence.

Reporters are judged in public less by actually what they do professionally and more by their perceived overall social or political clout, their focal standing in the business of information and communication, in war or peacetimes, in politics or commerce, and above all by their high potential to attract persuasion and propaganda.

This makes any reporter a target in the contemporary struggles for power, among thugs or clans, individuals or political, rebel groups. Media persons are also not spared because the “press” today is increasingly subsumed by the instantaneous and multifarious media vibes, aided by the ever-advancing technologies.

Many critics or detractors in society no longer like to fight the battles of ideas within the enlightened editorial columns; they want them real bloody, and they want the way they want, out in the open, often hostile to journalists.

In the new republican Nepal, identities, regional interests and divided loyalties will collide even more with the press that purports to focus, and should continue to focus, on common public interests. The culture of violence and impunity will lead us nowhere but to more Maguindanaos.

The question is what can be done about this?

While safety or conflict-sensitive training for journalists is essential, a more multi-pronged approach needs to be in place. The UN Security Council resolution (1738/2006) has in principle called for journalists’ right for protection in conflict zones. There is also the campaign for an international treaty to protect journalists, spearheaded by the Press Emblem Campaign (PEC) in Paris. The INSA safety code urges governments and security forces to respect the safety and freedom of movement of journalists, and let them perform freely, without intimidation, attack or harassment.

These steps have to reflect in local efforts. Too often, despite constitutional provisions for a free press, like in the Philippines or Nepal, abusers bask under political patronage and they are never brought to justice. There is the need for an independent legal support system and a help network for journalists in need.

In Nepal, the government recently allocated Rs.10 million for a fund to aid journalists victimized in conflict situations. It is a positive gesture, but what is also needed is a mechanism with resources that supports working journalists in risk on a continual basis. Institutionally, reporters often are left on their own. Media employers must vigorously decry abuses, as they always do, in alliance with professionals, but they must also not shy away from committing resources for the long-term safety of their staff.

Even novice reporters get excited about going out in the field since conflict reporting is one sure way to make quick advance in their career. However, employers need to ensure safety first, before the pursuit of a story. The INSA safety code is a useful compass. It emphasizes voluntary assignment in war zones of only experienced news gatherers, mandatory conflict-sensitive training, full knowledge of reporting conditions, contexts of the conflict, and humanitarian laws. Understanding should come coupled with tools, such as efficient safety equipment and health kits, personal insurance to all journalists, and free access to confidential counseling.

We need to assess these needs in our context so as to address them in a sustained way. They require resources, which are in short supply. Donors often tend to justify funding only after the tragedy strikes.

Journalists should also reflect seriously on their core professional values in these difficult times when anybody with a mobile phone can supersede their role. There are debates now in Manila on why the slain journalists were traveling with a crew of politicians. As in “embedded journalism”, such actions could be interpreted as lacking professional independence. A partisan press invites far more trouble.

Above all, we need to create a wider social awareness about the role of the press in a free society. In Nepal, the overriding public impression of a journalist is one who distorts information. It could as well be a perception of the press that is vigorous and vocal. But a “critical” press in a democracy does not have to be synonymous with a “negative” press. The general public as well as potential abusers of the media must be reached with reason before they may explode.

There are many tasks to tackle outside of the text even as we need to focus on the inside of it.

Dr. Adhikari is a co-initiator of Media Foundation, a research and policy institute in Kathmandu (media-foundation.org).

###

]]> tag:www.nepalmonitor.com,2009://1.997 2009-12-07T17:08:08Z 2009-12-09T11:21:15Z

The Kathmandu-based Media Foundation releases an inventory for journalists and writers, on the Constitution-Making Process (CMP)....

Nepal Monitor The Kathmandu-based Media Foundation releases an inventory for journalists and writers, on the Constitution-Making Process (CMP).

]]>

Nepal has barely 6 months left to reach the deadliine to write a new Constitution. The following is a timely and useful resource prepared by the Media Foundation.

Online Resources for Journalists Reporting/Writing on the Constitution-Making Process (CMP) in Nepal

Nov. 30/2009: All eyes in Nepal are on the Constitution-Making Process (CMP). With the May 28, 2010 deadline for the drafting of the constitution fast approaching, barely 6 months remain to reach the goal, requiring more intense focus on the process. This resource is part of an ongoing project of the Media Foundation to create an inventory on useful online information and tools on the CMP, for journalists, writers and researchers.

It includes global and national historical perspectives, a timeline for Nepal, links to Constitutional Committees and their activities, and useful online resources on CMP and the role of media. Above all, this tool kit is designed to help locate relevant information quickly and efficiently in a single platform.

Constitutional waves in history
As of November 20, 2009, the Constitution-finder (at University of Virginia at Richmond) records a total of 201 constitutions of nations and territories around the world. According to Dr Jochen Abr., Director of the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, there have been at least 3 major waves of constitution making in history. The first began after World War I. The second started after the liberalization process, following World War II. The collapse of the communist empire and the end of Cold War in 1989 coincided with another wave of constitution making, in what is also described as the “third wave” of democratization process.

A recent (March 4-7, 2008) Princeton University deliberation notes that the newest wave of constitution making has several distinct causes:

The new wave of constitution making has several distinct causes. Institutional crisis and the shift to multi-party rule as an attempt to generate greater governmental accountability necessitated new constitutions in some instances. In others, people have lost confidence in democracy and now seek to re-work some of the institutional arrangements putt in place earlier [Somewhat relevant to Nepal]. Wars and peace settlements [Relevant to Nepal], or the collapse of federations, have also precipitated the creation of new constitutions. In some instances, constitutions and constitution making are frameworks for continued negotiations and must assume the difficult task of creating order.”

Constitutions in history (some major examples)
Israel: The Ten Commandments of Moses (recorded circa 1450 BCE) is considered to be one of the earliest written constitutions or super-law (covenant

Greece: Athenian Constitution, more of a treatise than an abiding document (Written 350 B.C., most probably by Aristotle)

Middle-East: Muslims regard the Covenant of Medina, signed in 622 AD, as the world's first written constitution.

Modern world (key examples).
These were all messy affairs, requiring long dialogue, compromises and amendments:

USA: Following the United States Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, the independent 13 States adopted the US Articles of Confederations in the Continental Congress on November 15, 1777. But the accord did not help in the unity between States. The actual writing of the Constitution took a few months, but it was only ten years later (September 17, 1787) that the Constitution of the United States was adopted. It took 116 days between the convention and adoption. The new States agreed to vote for the Constitution a year later (1788) only when the framers promised to write and add Bill of Rights to the constitution (the first ten amendments to the Constitution).

France: Adopted on 3 Sept 1791. Original French Constitution, in French, published in Journal Officiel de la République Française, 5 October 1958. In English version (from National Assembly of France Website). The process took over two years. The French National Assembly began the process of drafting a constitution in the summer of 1789. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was approved by the National Assembly of France, August 26, 1789. It eventually became the preamble of the constitution. The constitution dissolved for a year due to internal strife, until October, 1792.

Norway: Signed on 17 May 1814, available at the Stortinget, the Parliament of Norway (amended on 20 February 2007) Written during late winter and spring of 1814 (inspired by U.S. and French constitutions).

Other earlier constitutions: Belgium (1831) Argentina (1853) Luxembourg (1868) Switzerland (1874; amended 1999, English & Nepali).

Neighboring countries/South Asia (the figures in parenthesis are not necessarily the years of first adoption): Afghanistan (2004) Bangladesh (1972), Bhutan (2008) China (adopted 4 Dec 1982) India (1949) the Maldives (2006) Nepal (interim, 2008) Pakistan (1999) Sri Lanka (1978).

The Indian Constitution process also took a long time, although not the actual writing of it. The seeds of the Indian Constitution (adopted on November 26, 1949) had been sown in the Government of India Act 1935, some 12 years before Independence in the midnight of 14 Aug, 1947, when constitutional committees were also formed. The draft constitution was written between Aug 29 and Nov 4, 1947 (a total of 67 days). But it took almost 3 years for open deliberation before it was adopted on 24 January, 1950.

Some Lessons from post-conflict countries (with prolonged civil wars, internal strife)
The CMP processes in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan, two of Asia’s post-conflict nations, and, for example, in Somalia, were messy, discordant, full of many compromises or time-consuming:

Afghanistan: Promulgated its latest Constitution; the sixth in the country, on January 4, 2004, more than 2 years after the Afghan Constitutional Commission was established on October 5, 2002. There were many disagreements and some postponements.

Somalia: After the peace agreement in 2004, Somalia began the CMP process with the goal to endorse the Constitution by the end of the five-year transitional period. However, volatile security and political environment has hampered the work and it has not been promulgated yet.

Timor-Leste: Referendum held on Aug 30, 1999. A year later, on Aug 30, 2001, elections held for an assembly to write a constitution. Six months later, on Feb 9, 2002, constitution approved.

Nepal’s experience
The timeline of constitutional development in Nepal goes back to 1768, when the state of Nepal was formed. But it was only 180 years later that the first law of the land, Nepal Sarkar Baidhanik Kanoon, 1948 (2004 B.S.) or Government of Nepal Act 2004 (English/Nepali), was written during the reign of Rana ruler Padma Shumshere (adopted on 1 April, 1948).

After the Rana Constitution, 5 more constitutions have been written and adopted: The Nepal Interim Government Act, 1951 (2007 B.S.) (English/Nepali), which saw 6 amendments, until the first general elections of 1959, when the first truly democratic Constitution-- The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1959 (2015 B.S.) (English/Nepali) was written and adopted. It was short-lived; less than two years later, King Mahendra introduced an assertive form of monarchy and outlawed political parties. The Constitution of Nepal 1962 (2019 B.S.) (English/Nepali) legitimized a one-party Panchyat rule. It was amended in 1967, 1976, and 1980.

Following the referendum of 1980, political restrictions were eased but political parties were not legalized until after the popular movement of 1990. After the restoration of multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 (2047 B.S.) (English/Nepali) was adopted on Nov. 9, 1990. Following a decade-long Maoist civil war, and a popular movement in mid-April 2006, the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007(2063 B.S.) was promulgated in January 2007. It suspended monarchy. Owing to many power struggles and grievances, this interim document has been amended as many as 6 times.

Most stable democracies amend their constitutions rather than suspend or scrap them to write a new one. However, Nepal’s experience is steeped in many power struggles, culminating in new writings of Constitutions.

· All past Constitutions can be found at sambhidhan.org

Timeline: The New Republic & Constitution-making
So far (as of November, 2009), the Constitutional Commission calendar has been amended for the 6th time.

Sep 26, 2007: The Seven-Party Alliance endorses a republican agenda
Dec 28, 2007: Parliament votes in favor of abolishing monarchy
Apr 10, 2008: Historic Constituent Assembly Elections held
May 27, 2008: Nepal swore in 575 lawmakers
May 28, 2008: Lawmakers vote just before midnight to abolish the 240-year-old Hindu monarchy and establish a secular republic
June 11, 2008: Deposed king Gyanendra leaves palace
June 26, 2008: PM Girija Prasad Koirala resigns to clear the way for the formation of a new coalition government
July 19, 2008: Lawmakers vote to elect the country’s president; no candidate won the 298 votes necessary
July 21, 2008: Ram Baran Yadav of Nepali Congress (NC) elected the President
July 23, 2008: Subash Nemwang of CPN (UML) unanimously elected the chairman of the Constituent Assembly (CA)
15 Aug, 2008: Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” elected Prime Minister of Nepal
Nov 16, 2008: Constitution Assembly endorses schedule for Constitutional Commission, the deadline for promulgation of the constitution on May 28, 2010
Dec 29, 2008: CA makes first amendment to CC calendar
Jan 6, 2009: CA makes second amendment to CC calendar
Jan 13, 2009: Madhav Nepal assigned chair of the CA Constitutional Committee
April 13, 2009: CA makes third amendment to CC calendar
April 29, 2009: CA makes fourth amendment to CC calendar
May 4, 2009: Pushpa Kamal Dahal resigns
May 23, 2009: The Parliament elected CPN-UML leader Madhav Kumar Nepal as the new Prime Minister
July 16, 2009: CA makes fifth amendment to CC calendar
August 28, 2009: Nilamber Acharya from Nepali Congress (NC) elected chair of the Constitution Drafting Commission
Sept 9, 2009: CA makes sixth amendment to CC calendar

Committees of the Constitutional Commission
Works of the committees have not moved smoothly. As of November-end, 2009, as reflected on the Website of the Constitutional Assembly of Nepal, only 4 committees had submitted preliminary draft report and the concept paper. There is the need for the news media to closely scrutinize their works and follow each committee more consistently, substantively and equally.

Main Constitutional Committee
· Constitutional Committee – Preliminary draft and concept paper submitted, submission date not mentioned in the draft. Secretary: Tek Prasad Dhungana (Phone # 977-1 5531218 Mobile # 977-9841362086)

Thematic Committees
· National Interest Preservation Committee – No info on concept paper submitted on Friday, May 22, 2009 (98 meetings, 337 hours) Phone # 977-01-4200229 Email: pnic@can.gov.np Committee Secretary: Krishna Hari Khadka (Phone # 4200229)

· Form of the Legislative Body Committee – Concept paper/preliminary draft report not complete (as of Nov 2009). Phone # 977-01-4200124/4200178 Toll Free 1660 01 22344 Email: legislativebody@can.gov.np Committee Secretary: Baldev Khadka (Phone # 4200124)

· Committee for Determining the Base of Cultural and Social solidarity – No info online, Email: socio_cultural_solidarity@can.gov.np

· Committee on the Distribution of Natural Resources, Financial Rights and Public Revenue- Preliminary draft and concept paper submitted on Friday, November 27, 2009 (98 meetings, 337 hours). Secretaries: Ram Sharan Ghimire (Phone # 4200206, mobile # 9741013119), Dr. Ravi Sharma Aryal (mobile # 9841417680) Email: natural.resource@can.gov.np

· Committee for Determining the Structure of Constitutional Bodies. No info on concept paper/preliminary draft report (as of Nov 2009).Phone # 977-01-4211812/4104014 Email: cbody_committee@yahoo.com or cbody_committee@can.gov.np

· Judicial System Committee - No info on concept paper/preliminary draft report (as of Nov 2009). No contact address except the Email: jsc@can.gov.np

· Committee for Determination of Forms of the Governance of State - No info on concept paper/preliminary draft report (as of Nov 2009). Phone # 977-1-42000134, 977-1-4200344. Email: rssn_samiti@can.gov.np Secretary: Mukunda Sharma (Phone # 977-1-42000134, 977-1-4200344)

· State Restructuring Committee – No info on concept paper/preliminary draft report (as of Nov 2009). Phone # 4120094/4200194 Email: restruct.state@can.gov.np Sectrary: Thakur Prasad Baral (Phone # 977-14200194 Mobile # 9741013103)

· Committee for the Protection of the Fundamental Rights of Minorities and Marginalized Communities – Preliminary draft and final concept paper submitted, submission date not mentioned in the document. No contact address, phone # or email ID given.

· Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles – No info on concept paper/preliminary draft report (as of Nov 2009). Phone # 977-1-4200233 Toll Free 1660 01 22344. Secretary: Toya Nath Bhattarai (Phone # 977-1-4200233). Email: moulik.hak@can.gov.np

Procedural Committees
· Committee on Citizens – No info on concept paper/preliminary draft report (as of Nov 2009). It has two sub-committees— Civil Relation Committee (members’ phone #s given) and Empowerment Committee (Phone # 977-1-4200097 or directly the Secretary: Birendra Bahadur Karki, mobile # 9741013110). Committee email crc@can.gov.np

· Public Opinion Collection and Coordination Committee - No info on concept paper/preliminary draft report (as of Nov 2009). No contact address except the Email: poccc@can.gov.np

· Capacity Building & Source Management Committee - No info on concept paper/preliminary draft report (as of Nov 2009). Committee Email: cbsm@can.gov.np Secretary: Birendra Bahadur Karki Phone # # 9741013110

Useful Links on Constitution-building in Nepal
· Constitutional Committee, Constituent Assembly of Nepal (official Website): Available (in Nepali language) CC members and staff (their phone numbers included), calendar of CC, its jurisdiction, major decisions, TOR, and report submitted by the Drafting Sub-Committee

· The Centre for Constitutional Dialogue (CCD) is a resource centre established to support Nepal’s constitution making process. The CCD is an initiative by the UNDP project on Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal. Includes resources on Constitutions and Constitution-making

· UNDP Support to Constitution Building, a critical component of its rule of law work around the world, includes a variety of information on the CMP as well as on topics of special interest such as minorities, civil society and the media. It also archives the news on CMP covered by Nepal’s media.

· IDEA/Nepal has several useful publications and policy analyses, including a glossary of federalism terms and citizens’ guide to creating the new Constitution.

· The Comparative Constitutions Project by scholars committed to assisting constitutional design, in collaboration with the United States Institute of Peace, offers a global perspective. They also have a blog.

Some expert references on the Constitution or its making
Constitution Making in Nepal: Report of a Conference organized by the Constitution Advisory Support Unit, UNDP, 3 - 4 March 2007, Kathmandu, Nepal. [Available here, in PDF format]

Creating the New Constitution: A Guide for Nepali Citizens (Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, Eds.), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Feb 2009. Available in Nepali and English; can be downloaded in PDF after registration.

Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, International Crisis Group, Brussels, 15 June, 2005. [Available in HTML and Word]

“Paper by Surya Nath Upadhyaya on Making of the 1990 Constitution,” (Available as Appendix 2, in Constitution Making in Nepal, pp. 45-48).

Michael Hutt, “Drafting the Nepal Constitution, 1990”, Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 11 (Nov., 1991), pp. 1020-1039. [Available on JSTOR, with a subscription only)

Kirsti Samuels, “Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making,” Chicago. Journal of International Law, Vol 6, Number 2, (Winter 2006): 663-682. [Available in PDF]

Links to articles on Constitution and the CA in various Nepali media outlets, collected by Nepalresearch.com (they go back to 2004).

Media Resources for Nepal
Because of their increasingly wider access, outreach and public influence, the media today in Nepal are seen vital in creating awareness on the process and issues of CMP. A vigilant and critical press reports consistently on the constitutional process and interprets its many facets in a balanced manner.

Too often, reporting on the CMP is perceived as a boring enterprise, and experts also criticize reporters’ works as shallow and sensational. The challenge before journalists and writers is how to cover it in a realistic frame, enable a lively and comprehensive debate on the many critical issues of the Constitution, and perhaps more importantly, help define the role of media under the new Constitution.

Although seminars focusing on media role (more often on the provisions for media freedoms) in the CPA have become not too infrequent in the past year, online access (an in many cases offline also) to the proceedings are hardly available. Most of the sponsors of such seminars have Web presence.

■ The Nepal Research Website has some links leading to stories on media vis-à-vis the Constitution and the CPA.

■ The Nepal Press Institute (with support from Japan International Cooperation Agency/Nepal- JICA Nepal) recently released Samidhan ra Media (2009) [Constitution and the Media, 2009; 161 pages, price not listed]. The book is not available online.

The Nepali language book includes four essays, three of which relate to the media. The essay “The CMP and the Press” (Kashi Raj Dahal) dwells on the process and subject matter of the CMP, role of the press in a democracy, the Constitution and press freedom, the role of the press in the CMP (present alternatives, inform the public, form public opinion on nature of democracy, state structure, form of government, electoral system, etc.). This is a normative essay focusing on the theoretical foundations of democracy.

The paper “Inclusion and the Mass Media” (Kundan Aryal) traces the roots of inclusiveness in Nepal, common commitments and issues of concern, political communication and Nepali mass media. Some empirical material on how the Nepali press covers politics (has not taken as much initiative in fostering the debate as it did in calling for consolidation of democracy and political inclusion, the coverage is ritualistic, shallow, driven by political speeches, at analysis on the various committees is skewed).

“People’s Right to Information” (Agni Kharel & Tanka Prasad Dulal) offers perspectives on global and local developments in the RTI, provisions in the Constitution, and examines some cases.

■ A summary of the seminar on the role of media in Constitution-making, organized by Press Chautari Nepal (PC) with support from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Nepal, 4 July 2009, Nagarkot.

■ A case from EU: Julie Firmstone and Paul Statham examine social actors, their communicative links, level of participation and debates during the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty in the British media [Available in PDF].

Expert sources
Too often, in Nepal, politicians become news sources rather than experts. While lawmakers (as chairs of committees) and party leaders make good news sources for their experiences and political positions, the best journalistic practice to reach a better and objective version of a truth is to quote various experts on a given field of knowledge.

The CCD’s Roster of Experts may serve as a beginning point. Unfortunately, contact addresses for these experts are not given, and they also have no page for media outreach. For general info, the CCD can be contacted 977-1-4785998 / 4785486 / 4785466. Facsimile: 977-1-4785487. E-mail: info@ccd.org.np

The Society of Constitutional and Parliamentary Exercises (SCOPE) Website also leads to some expert sources. The executive board on their Consortium of Constitutional Experts (CONCOE) has some names (but without contact addresses). They can be reached at 00 977 1) 4410624 or 4411303. Email: scopenp@gmail.com

Links of interest
Nepal Constituent Assembly Portal (CA Portal), Nepal Law Commission (NLC, Constitution page here), Supreme Court of Nepal (SC), Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MLJPA), Nepal Bar Association (NBA). The US-based non-profit, constitution.org, has many resources covering Constitutions)

The Media in Post-Conflict Societies (MPCS) from Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), and Media in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations (MCPCS/UNESCO) resources for media.

To add resources or and to update this inventory, please email us at mediafoundnepal@gmail.com

###

]]>