Nepal Monitor: The National Online Journal

Kathmandu, Feb 28, 2011-- In a report released today, Carter Center observers found that overall clashes between Nepal's political party youth wings appear to have decreased. However, many activities of the Maoist-affiliated Young Communist League (YCL) and, to a lesser extent, the CPN-UML Youth Force remain targeted toward financial gain, and youth wing activity continues to have a negative impact on security in many districts.

"Political party youth wings have the potential to play a positive role in Nepal," said Dr. David Pottie, associate director of the Carter Center's Democracy Program. "However, we have found the YCL and the CPN-UML Youth Force engaged in interference with tender processes, taxation, and other activities that undermine political space, development, and public security."

The Carter Center's report also covers Maoist compliance with the June 2008 agreement to terminate the YCL's "paramilitary functioning." The Center found that there is no shared definition of the term "paramilitary," thus leading to confusion and difficulty in evaluating compliance.

The large majority of YCL sites visited by Carter Center observers did not appear to be organized in a military-style hierarchy. However, observers did find one site in Kaski that was intended to serve as a "rapid response force" and where cadres appeared to be unable to leave without permission from their superiors. Observers also found cases where YCL cadres were living communally in private and sometimes public buildings, but found no evidence in these cases of a military-style hierarchy.

Overall, there have been very few public activities conducted by political party youth wings since June 2010. The UCPN(M) and UML appear to have the most active youth wings, with the Nepali Congress, Madhesi parties, and other smaller party youth wings conducting only limited activities at the local level. Members report undertaking constructive activities such as community service and development works but these appear mostly low-profile and are often difficult to verify. Observers also heard many reports of negative youth wing activities, primarily involving the YCL and, to a lesser extent, the CPN-UML Youth Force. The Federal Limbuwan State Council Limbuwan Volunteers were also implicated in negative activities in the Eastern hills.

The report is based on recent findings of Carter Center observers throughout the country, who have observed the post-election peace and constitutional drafting process since June 2009. The Center collected information on youth wings in 30 districts through interviews with political party youth wing members, district administration officials, political parties, civil society, and citizens. The Center's report looks into who joins political party youth wings, what they receive, and what their aspirations are after joining. It also addresses what kinds of activities political party youth wings engage in and to what degree these activities are in compliance with the peace process agreements signed by their mother parties. An annex at the end of the report provides information on individual youth wing organizations such as self-reported membership estimates and organizational structures.

The following is the Summary of Findngs:
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A. Youth Wing Members
Most Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML youth wing members interviewed were affiliated with their respective political parties before they joined the party youth wing. Most Tarun Dal and UML youth wing cadres first became involved in student politics and then joined the respective political party youth wing. Many also said they were from politically "minded" or "affiliated" families.

Most YCL youth wing members interviewed were also affiliated with the Maoist party prior to their joining the YCL. In multiple districts, Carter Center observers met YCL members who were former PLA combatants. Many YCL cadres also entered the youth wing after joining the Maoist student union. However, some YCL cadres, notably in senior level positions, are former PLA combatants who were active during the decade-long conflict. They were then either "assigned" by the party to the YCL instead of going to the cantonments, or they entered the cantonments and then left voluntarily or were discharged.

Most identity based youth wing members interviewed say they joined to advance the rights of their own identity group. Nearly all Madhesi youth wing cadres said they joined because they were motivated to promote Madhesi rights. The vast majority were inspired by the 2007 Madhesi Andolan and some cited individual political leaders as inspiration. Most Limbuwan Volunteer (LV) cadres interviewed were previously affiliated with either the UCPN(M), UML or NC and joined the Federal Limbuwan State Council (FLSC) to "fight for a Limbuwan state."

Many youth wing cadres are seeking a political career in the future. Nearly all YCL members interviewed expressed a strong desire to remain involved with the party in any capacity deemed appropriate by the party. Many Tarun Dal, UML YFN, and Madhesi party youth wing cadres are hoping to become high-ranking officials within the party or government. However, some expressed concern that they would not be able to afford to join politics full-time. A few Tarun Dal cadres also expressed concern about remaining with the party and noted a long and difficult process for moving up within the NC ranks.

B. Youth Wing Activities
Overall, there have been very few public activities conducted by any political party youth wings since June 2010. Central level UCPN(M), UML, and NC youth wing leaders acknowledged that activity levels have decreased. The main reasons cited for the lack of youth wing activities were: 1) no central level directives from the mother party, and 2) the national level political deadlock.

The YCL appears to be the largest and most active political party youth wing at the local level. The UML YFN appears to be the second largest and most active political party youth wing; the NC Tarun Dal has a presence in all districts, but is mostly inactive. Madhesi political parties have formed youth wings as well but their activities have been quite limited. Finally, a number of smaller parties and identity based groups have also formed youth wings. Of these, the FLSC LVs in the Eastern Region hills are by far the most active.

Youth wing members report activities including membership drives, support to party events, development works, community service, and public security. The Carter Center was able to verify a small number of these reported activities. Almost all youth wings say that, in addition to membership drives and support for mother party events, they have engaged in public service through activities such as road construction, street cleaning, temporary health camps, blood donation drives, tree planting, public campaigns to promote sanitary practices, and campaigns to curb smuggling, deceitful business practices, and "social evils." However, such activities were often found to be difficult to verify.

Carter Center observers have also heard many reports of negative youth wing activities, primarily involving the YCL and, to a lesser extent, the CPN-UML Youth Force, which are aimed at obtaining financial gain and which have the effect of undermining political space, development, and public security. FLSC LVs were also implicated in the Eastern hills. In many districts, the YCL and, to a lesser extent, the UML Youth Force, have interfered in contract tender processes, been complicit in smuggling, solicited forced donations, and engaged in violent clashes. Additionally, in some districts, YCL has used intimidation and violence to control political space. Finally, in the Eastern Hills observers heard some reports of FLSC LVs interfering in contract tender processes, and becoming involved in illegal logging.
Youth wing violence and clashes appear to have decreased. However, nearly all clashes involving youth wings include YCL cadres and most clashes have been between YCL and UML Youth Force cadres. The most direct sources of tension and conflicts involving youth wings have been around: efforts to influence contract tender processes; efforts to assert influence over selection processes for users groups or school management committees (SMCs); escalations of minor political disputes, personal disputes, or conflicts between student unions; and efforts to control - and in response, preserve - political space.

Despite a decrease in violence in the short-term, there appears to be a longer-term trend towards increased use of youth wings as "muscle power." Both the financial benefits that YCL and YF members are accruing as well as the enhanced "muscle power" that comes with a more aggressive youth wing have created incentives for other parties to at least consider following in this line. The CPN-UML provides a sobering example of the challenges in trying to control such a force once it has been created.

C. YCL "Paramilitary Functioning"
YCL "paramilitary functioning" is difficult to assess, in large part due to the lack of agreement on a common definition of the term "paramilitary." UML and NC representatives generally contend that YCL "communal living" (i.e., cadres living together in the same physical location) constitutes paramilitary functioning. By contrast, UCPN(M) representatives generally contend that YCL communal living does not constitute paramilitary functioning, but is merely "economical, ideological, and voluntary."

The majority of YCL sites visited by the Carter Center did not appear to be organized in a military-style hierarchy. However, observers did find one site in Kaski which was intended to serve as a "rapid response force" and where military terminology was used by a small number of interviewees to describe the organization's structure. Carter Center observers spoke with several individuals who described an organizational structure of platoons, brigades, and companies, although it was not clear if this was a current or previous structure. Other interviewees also spoke about the camp‟s purpose to provide a "rapid response force" in case of any clashes or disputes in the Pokhara area.
The Carter Center found several instances of YCL living communally in government buildings and many instances of YCL living communally in private buildings. In none of these cases could it be determined that the YCL was organized in a military-style hierarchy or that such arrangements were party-mandated. More often than not, these arrangements seemed to be sanctioned, but not imposed, by the party, or were circumstantial given that observers met many YCL who had relocated from other districts and did not have a home in the area.

In some parts of the country, observers heard scattered reports of YCL conducting physical fitness or self-defense training; however, they did not find evidence nor hear credible reports of YCL using firearms. Following the Maoists‟ May 2010 protest programs, observers have heard only a few subsequent reports in some parts of the country of sporadic trainings conducted. Physical fitness and self-defense trainings sometimes reportedly involve lathis and khukuris10 but not firearms.

Regardless of the terminology used, many government officials, non-Maoist party representatives, civil society representatives and citizens have expressed concern about the existence of YCL communal living sites. However, some citizens interviewed have also expressed positive sentiments. Those expressing concerns generally reference widely publicized incidents of violence and intimidation, often involving groups of cadres; the legacy of the conflict, especially in highly affected areas or where the presence of the state remains weak; and the fact some YCL district leaders and members are former PLA combatants.

> For the complete, 31-page report, click here (in PDF)
> For a Nepali-language version of the report, see here.

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